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ABSTRACT 
US counter-narcotic policies towards Burma have possessed a singular-focus. In 
other words, they have been based on the traditional bilateral triumvirate strategies of 
eradication, education, and interdiction. Eradicate the crops used to produce illicit 
narcotics, interdict the flow of illicit drug traffickers, and educate the general population 
on the dangers of continual drug usage. In the country of Burma though, there are other 
US policies which also have a singular focus, which have undermined the effectiveness 
of these policies.  
Since the Burmese military regime’s brutal suppression of the pro-democracy 
movement in 1988, the US has severed all economic relations with the country. The 
Burmese economy, which was already far from stable, fell into a downward spiral as a 
result of these US-led policies. This did not result in a democratic transition. Over 
seventeen years since these economic sanctions have been in place, the US has not 
achieved a peaceful regime change in Burma. Furthermore, the attempts to remove the 
significant flow of illicit narcotics from the country have failed as well.  
The reason these two singular-oriented policies have failed is that they are 
targeted at a country much more complex than these strategies have been designed to 
handle. First of all, there are 135 ethnicities in Burma, while only a small portion of the 
Burman population maintains political and economic control.  Although this would result 
in ineffective policies with little collateral impact, the ruling Tatmadaw regime has 
manipulated these policies to commit ethnic genocide upon the ethnic minorities within 
their territory. Unless a re-assessment of these policies is undertaken by the US and its 
allies, the only result of their policies will be the elimination of millions of ethnic 
minorities in this totalitarian state. 
Therefore, the US must re-assess its position of isolating the Myanmar regime, 
and focus on a policy of engagement. Only if a structured and progressive incentive 
policy of economic development is created in conjunction with the regime, can the 
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Burma is the second largest producer and trafficker of heroin in the world today, 
second only to Afghanistan.1 Additionally, Burma is one of the largest producers of 
methamphetamines in mainland Southeast Asia. In the 2006 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR)2, Burma was designated as a focus-country concerning 
the levels of illegal narcotics produced within, and transported from, the country.3  This 
report identifies Burma’s high production and export of illegal narcotics to be a 
significant destabilizing force in Southeast Asia, as well as the rest of the world. 
From a strategic perspective, the United States (US) has a significant stake in the 
Southeast Asian mainland and does not want the region to be destabilized. The largest 
strategic competitor to the US is China, which borders Burma, Laos, and Vietnam to the 
North. Any destabilization in the region would only improve China’s position vis-à-vis 
the US concerning the other nation-states on the mainland. Furthermore, the eastern 
region of Burma, where the majority of the Burmese opium and amphetamine-type 
substance (ATS) production occurs, also borders the US’ most important regional ally: 
Thailand. 
On October 19, 2003, President George W. Bush designated Thailand a Major 
Non-NATO ally (MNNA).4 Being designated an MNNA guarantees Thailand mutual 
security status with the United States, second only to those countries in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). Thailand is also a pivotal ally to the US regarding the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), providing vital intelligence on regional terrorist  
 
 
                                                 
1 CIA World Factbook. Downloaded from www.cia.gov/factbook/  on September 13, 2005. Estimated 
production in 2004 at 292 metric tons. 
2 INCSR 2006. 
3 23rd time Burma was designated in the INCSR. 
4 DoS Thailand Embassy website. Downloaded from http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/ on November 17, 
2005.  
2 
organizations. Due to the US’ close relationship with Thailand and its proximity to 
China, Burma has become a focal point for the United States’ international counter-
narcotic policies in Southeast Asia. 
The flow of illegal drugs from Burma does not end in Thailand. Instead, the flow 
of narcotics transportation continues on to the global black markets, spreading their 
destabilizing effects into countries around the world. In August 2002, “yaa baa” 
methamphetamine pills produced in Burma were seized by US customs agents in 
Sacramento, CA.5  At least 75,000 “yaa baa” pills were seized in the raid, a significant 
number considering the distance they had to travel before they were captured.6  
The INCSR report, which identifies the countries considered to be complicit in 
the production, transportation, or money laundering and financial crimes in support of 
narcotics trafficking, is submitted annually from the Department of State to the US 
Congress. The report focuses on US’ foreign relations and international narcotics 
programs in compliance with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.7  This year Burma was designated a major 
illicit drug producing and transit country as well as a major money laundering country.8 
The INCSR coordinates the US policy-orientation toward Burma’s widespread 
trafficking of illicit narcotics, but also connects the US policies to the United Nations 
Office of Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) policies in Burma. This also links the US 
counter-narcotic efforts to the other UN counter-narcotic policies implemented by 
additional nation-states into a multilateral effort.  
Not surprisingly, Burma is a complex country where a singular policy orientation 
does not resolve the issue of narcotics production within the country. The main reason is 
that the illicit drug producers in Burma are not a corrupt faction of the Burmese 
government, nor are they members of the ethnic majority. The majority of the drug-
producing warlords in Burma are from small minority paramilitary forces in the 
mountainous periphery of the country. The general population in the mountainous areas 
                                                 
5 Yaa Baa means “crazy medicine” in Burmese; It refers to the extremely potent type of ATS produced 
in Northeastern Burma. 
6 Downloaded from the ALTSEAN Narcotics Chronology at www.altasean.org. 
7 1988 UN  Drug Convention – INCSR p. 3. 
8 One of the few countries designated as non-compliant in all three areas; - INCSR p. 3. 
3 
of Northeastern Burma uses opium as a cash crop to trade for food. Unfortunately, rice 
does not grow well in this region, and opium is the sole agricultural product for these 
minority farming communities.   
The insurgent ethnic paramilitaries, which have traditionally defended these 
minorities and fought for autonomy from the Tatmadaw regime, have maintained their 
forces through the trafficking of these illegal narcotics.9 Because these forces are in 
opposition to the ruling government of Burma, a coordinated effort between counter-
narcotic forces in Burma and the US should effectively establish a powerful in-road 
against the drug producing warlords. However, the true nature of this issue is much more 
complex than the trans-national flow of illegal narcotics.  
The primary reason for the complexity of enacting counter-narcotic policies in 
Burma is the illegal regime which has maintained control of the country since 1962. 
Because of the Myanmar regime, Burma is not just a focal point for the US due to the 
production and trafficking of illegal narcotics. As a result of the brutal suppression of 
student protestors during the “8-8-88 massacres” in 1988, the United States has enacted 
economic sanctions for the goal of encouraging regime change and democratization in the 
country.10  
Immediately following the US’ condemnation of the Rangoon regime, the US 
severed all economic aid to the country, and established sanctions against the ruling 
party. Currently the US foreign policy toward the Tatmadaw regime in Burma has been 
one of isolation. Multilateral economic sanctions, led by the US and the United Kingdom, 
have forced the regime to seek support among its Southeast Asian neighbors and other 
global powers.11  This support has enabled the regime to survive despite sanctions from 
the Western economies isolating the regime for the past seventeen years. 
 The dual natures of the economic and counter-narcotic policies have created a 
situation which ruling Myanmar regime can manipulate with ease. The regime, due to its 
                                                 
9 Tatmadaw is the name of the military in Burma. The regime’s ruling council made up of active and 
retired generals form the Tatmadaw. The regime is referred to as the Tatmadaw Regime, Rangoon Regime, 
Military Junta, and Myanmar Regime. This thesis will focus on differentiating the regime form the country 
of Burma, while highlighting that the military’s connection to the ruling council is where the control is 
maintained.    
10 Fink, p. 50. 
11 China and Russia.  
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complete control of the country’s economy, has transferred the destabilizing effects of the 
economic sanctions toward the general population, further consolidating and centralizing 
its power. Because the focus of the regime has been solidarity and unity among its 
population since Burma gained independence in 1948, this centralizing effect of the 
sanctions works in the favor of the regime.  This has worked against not only the 
democratic movements within its own ethnic majority, but the ethnic minorities fighting 
for autonomy as well.  
Because the ethnic minorities and their insurgent military forces in the periphery 
of the country have been removed from the general economic infrastructure for some 
time, they have been forced to subsist on an illegal trade of narcotics; opium and 
methamphetamines. Consequently, Burma’s trans-national sale of these drugs has made 
them the target of international counter-narcotic efforts, led by the US. The combined 
policies of eradication, interdiction, and education have undermined the sole source of 
subsistence for millions of people already suppressed by their own government.  
The combined result of these “good-intentioned” policies is to support the true 
goal of the Tatmadaw regime in Burma, which is the ethnic cleansing of the minorities in 
opposition to the authoritarian rule of the country’s military.  In the seventeen years since 
the US established the economic sanctions against the Myanmar regime, no 
democratization has occurred in the government. Furthermore, with the manipulation of 
the information the US receives concerning the opium ban, the US’ belief that the flow of 
drugs from Southeast Asia is being eliminated, is incorrect.  
By re-evaluating these policies, including the policies of economic isolation 
through sanctions which the US has implemented against the regime, an adjustment 
towards progressive engagement could bring the Myanmar regime back towards peaceful 
democratic negotiations. A progressive democratic regime is what is needed in order to 




This research focuses on the United States’ counter-narcotics policies in Southeast 
Asia, and those policies being subverted by the illegal Myanmar regime in Burma to 
5 
commit genocide against the ethnic minorities in their territory. Recently, US economic 
policies toward Burma have focused on imposing multilateral sanctions in order to 
encourage the restoration of the legal democratic regime. Regrettably, these sanctions 
have been devastating to the Burmese economy, yet not effective in dislodging the illegal 
regime.  
Furthermore, with the application of UN and US counter-narcotic policies in 
Southeast Asia focusing on eliminating the drug flow, these policies are starving and 
undermining the very ethnic minorities the sanctions are meant to empower. 
This thesis intends to highlight the difference between the democratic movements 
in central Burma and the ethnic minority conflicts on the periphery. Because US policies 
are focused on the restoration of a democratic government and the elimination of illegal 
narcotics, the resulting actions of genocide have been largely ignored outside of 
international human rights organizations.  
The intention of the Tatmadaw is to maintain power, and they will manipulate 
these policies by any means necessary as long as it allows them to stay in control. The 
US, as the premier advocate of human rights, cannot allow its policies to be in aid of 
ethnic cleansing. 
Simple policy adjustments concerning economic sanctions can be implemented in 
order to bring the junta back towards a policy of engagement with the democratic 
leadership in the country, and therefore the international community. If these adjustments 
are made, then the traditionally effective counter-narcotic policies the US is attempting to 
enact could be re-implemented with a focus toward developing alternate means of 




The flow of heroin and methamphetamines from Burma is a major destabilizing 
force in Southeast Asian regional security. There are currently one million “yaa baa” 
addicts in Thailand today and shipments of “yaa baa” methamphetamines from Burma 
have reached as far as Sacramento, CA.12 
                                                 
12 75,000 pills were seized by US Federal Agents in a warehouse in 2003. Downloaded from 
www.altasean.org on August, 9, 2005.  
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The level of human rights atrocities in Burma have not only gone unchecked for 
over forty years, but have begun to accelerate. The levels of human rights abuses have 
caused other trans-national problems which are affecting additional countries in mainland 
Southeast Asia. Refugees have been escaping the abuses of the Tatmadaw by fleeing to 
Thailand and HIV/AIDS infections are at unprecedented levels. Furthermore, the 
conditions in the country of Burma are ideal for the economic support of terrorist 
organizations. The military junta’s focus is on acquiring money to support their rule and 
their policies of ethnic cleansing.  
From a strategic point of view, the continued counter-narcotic and sanction efforts 
have alienated Burma from not only Western countries, but have begun to force the 
Myanmar regime closer and closer into a satellite relationship with China. With India and 
China both bordering Burma, their strategic interests concerning the xenophobic 
Myanmar regime only intensifies the destabilizing power of the situation in Southeast 
Asia. 
 
D. METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There is extensive writing on the subject of illegal transnational narcotics 
smuggling from the Golden Triangle. Even with Afghanistan surpassing the region in 
heroin production following the Taliban’s removal from power, the flow of dangerous 
narcotics to the rest of the world has prompted numerous analyses of the origins of the 
drug trade, the effects on the regional populations, and potential policies which could be 
taken to counter the drug flow from the region. Annual reports from the US Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime (UNODC), as 
well as other national counter-drug agencies, have fueled numerous scholarly analyses of 
this dilemma.  
Furthermore, there is a considerable amount of writing on the subject of freeing 
and establishing the elected National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung Suu 
Sang Kyi. Unfortunately, except for a few authors studying the effects of these policies 
upon Burma and the ethnicities within its borders, no author has addressed the issues 
7 
concerning how the combination of these policies could affect the minorities trying to 
survive within a chaotic environment like Modern Myanmar. 
Pierre Arnaud Chouvy, in his article “Opium Ban Risks Greater Insecurity for Wa 
in Myanmar” is the closest in his assessment of the damage of the conflicting US policies 
to the ethnic minorities in Burma. Pierre claims that any action in Northeastern Burma 
that removes the sole source of income for the displaced minorities will only result in 
widespread famine and death. Pierre’s arguments are strong in statistical analyses about 
the reduction in opium, and address the “complex geopolitical chessboard” facing the 
ethnic minorities in Burma. Chouvy does not delve into the motivations of the Myanmar 
military beyond a focus on maintaining sovereignty and control though. He focuses 
instead on whether or not the Wa warlords are compliant in their opium reduction as a 
result of the autonomy. This is an important focus which sets the WA ethnicity away 
from the WA warlords as players in the decision concerning narcotic production, and sets 
the stage for a better understanding on how the perpetuation of ethnic conflict is used to 
garner benefits for selected elites on both sides of the ethnic conflict.  
Jake Sherman, in his article: “Burma: Lessons from the Cease-Fire,” in the edited 
book: The Political Economy of Armed Conflict establishes an important change in 
thinking concerning the ability of powers to gain benefits from continuing conflicts. 
Sherman begins his study by quoting David Keen. Keen stated that “part of the function 
of war may be that it offers a more promising environment for the pursuit of aims that are 
also prominent in peacetime . . . [keeping] a war going may assist in the achievement of 
these aims, and prolonging a war may be a higher priority than wining it.” Sherman states 
that there are “actually two conflicts in Burma: Military Junta vs. the NLD / the military 
government and certain ethnic minority armed groups with which it is informally allied, 
and on the other hand, opposition armed ethnic minority group.” By perpetuating conflict 
with some minorities, and maintaining cease-fires with others, the NLD’s considerable 
support base from the ethnic minorities is eroded. While political economy writing has 
shifted into a stronger focus on the benefits of certain types of economic situations being 
perpetuated can create for elites in a conflict-economy, there is very little written 
specifically on Burma concerning this subject. Instead, this study has focused on African 
nations due to the larger availability of data on the subject.  
8 
Published in Joel Migdal’s Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the 
Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices, Mary Callahan, in her article “Making 
Myanmars: Language, Territory, and Belonging in Post-Socialist Burma” connects the 
link between the effects of the 1992 NLD election victories upon the psychology of the 
Myanmar regime. With the significant amount of consolidated support achieved by Aung 
San Suu Kyi and the NLD from the general Burmese population, as well as the ethnic 
minorities in the periphery regions, the paranoia of the Myanmar regime grew to higher 
levels. This is symbolized in the government policies of “Myanmarization” now in 
progress in the country. By eliminating the language and cultures of the ethnic minorities 
through educational programs, there is now a serious attempt by the Myanmar regime to 
absorb the non-violent remnants of the minority populations in the country. Mary 
Callahan establishes the continued actions of the Myanmar regime are just continuations 
of the same policies, the elimination of the ethnic power bases at the periphery of the 
country. As seen by the Jake Sherman article on perpetuating armed conflict, this is a 
goal which could be achieved while perpetuating their genocide of less-compliant ethnic 
minorities.  
This is only a reasonable assessment if the psychological character of the 
Myanmar regime reflects these intentions. Andrew Selth’s Burma’s Armed Forces: 
Power without Glory, he addresses the history of the Myanmar regime, as well as the 
mind-set of the leadership in the policies it has implemented since coming to power in 
1962. Giving powerful credence to the position of Burma as a lowland cross-road 
between significant global powers (India & China), Selth claims consolidation of any 
power in Burma requires a balance over these two geo-strategic powers. Furthermore, 
Stelth emphasizes the difficulty of surviving what he calls, in Samuel Huntington’s terms, 
“a position across the fault line of three major civilizations: the Hindus, Buddhists, and 
Confucians.” The psychology of the Myanmar regime is vital to establishing the 
reasoning behind the actions of the military junta in throughout its rule can actually be 
linked to a long-standing character of the Burmese in their attempts to consolidate power 
within the region in the face of global powers on both of their borders.  
Although many studies concerning Burma and the Myanmar regime have been 
published in recent years, they have rarely been focused on more than one aspect of the 
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country. Burma is traditionally studied from the perspective of democratization, human 
rights atrocities, the significant drug trade, or the ruling Tatmadaw military regime itself. 
Some authors have begun to address the issue of the economic sanctions causing more 
damage to the rural populations in the region, but no one has researched how the 
Tatmadaw has structured the political economy to their benefit. 
Even the recent studies of the perpetuation of violence for the creation of a 
conflict-economy are a foray into political economic thought. The methodology applied 
in Jake Sherman and Karen Ballentine’s The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: 
beyond Greed and Grievance (2003) and Mats Berdal and David Malone’s Greed and 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (2000) as a form of analysis for internal 
conflict economies was primarily applied to the conflicts within Cambodia, Sierra-Leone, 
and Angola. This study has not been analyzed within the context of the military regime in 
Burma and their attempts to commit ethnic genocide.  
In truth, the factors which establish a shadow economy are typical of the 
economic manipulation for ulterior motives in a conflict economy like the one which 
exists in Burma today.13 The effects of humanitarian aid, economic sanctions, and the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) outside of sanctions must be studied in the context of a 
dual-economy, not the traditional study of an economy which is not experiencing an 
internal conflict.  
 
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
1. Chapter I – Introduction 
 
The introduction will focus on the background behind the current situation in 
Burma and state the purpose and importance of the research.  In addition, the dangers of 
the perpetuation of single-scope policies toward Burma will be established. Eventually, a 
multi-faceted approach to the complex layers of Burma, the illegal Myanmar regime, and  
 
                                                 
13 A Shadow Economy is an alternate method of economic growth maintained during a period of 
conflict or civil war. Shadow economies are related to illegal activities like narcotics trafficking, human 
slavery, and smuggling. Natural resources like oil, diamonds, and timber are the targets for exploitation, 
especially in a perpetual conflict like a civil war. 
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the ethnic warlords within the country, is needed to solve this Gordian knot of policies. 
The methodology of the case study, as well as the organization of the study, will be 
established in the introduction.  
 
2. Chapter II – History  
 
In the second chapter of the thesis, the focus will be on the historical background 
behind the current situation in Burma. The history of ethnic conflict, the rise of the 
Myanmar regime, and the treaties established with various insurgencies following the 
1988 cease-fires will gain important focus. By showing that there is a consistent theme of 
playing ethnicities against each other to preserve a homogenous power-base among the 
Burmese ruling regime, a framework for the policies pursued by the Myanmar regime 
will be shown. 
Furthermore, this history chapter will focus on countering the Myanmar regime’s 
public relations publications which focus the blame for the country’s problems on the 
period of British colonialism.  
 
3. Chapter III – Current Myanmar  
 
In the third chapter of this thesis, the historical policies of the regime can be seen 
in their current incarnation. The current ethnic conflict, the perpetuation of the Burmese 
conflict economy, and the spillover into international politics will be the main areas of 
analysis. Additionally, the three-pronged conflict between the Myanmar regime, the 
democratic movement against the military regime, and the ethnic populations at the 
periphery of the Burmese lands will be established in this chapter. 
All of the important actors, both domestic and international, will be analyzed in 
this chapter. It will continue with a study of the international community, and the 
influence of the international movement toward multilateral sanctions against the 
Myanmar regime. The role the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) fulfills as the 
current center stage of the ongoing debate on how to deal with sanctions against the 
Myanmar regime.  
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Finally, this chapter will cover the role Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and ASEAN-plus nations have on the political and economic relationships 
within, and outside of, Burma.  
 
4. Chapter IV – Patterns of Narcotic Smuggling 
 
The fourth chapter will focus on the patterns of narcotics smuggling out of 
Burma. An Analysis of the production, movement, and distribution of heroin and 
methamphetamines enable the understanding of the policies undertaken by the Myanmar 
regime. Furthermore, the results of the spillover of narcotics production and smuggling 
into regional and global black markets will be established in this chapter. How this 
trafficking has inspired the US-led multilateral initiatives to counter the flow of these 
narcotics will also be shown.  
 
5. Chapter V – US / International Counter-narcotic Policies 
 
The fifth chapter will discuss the policies pursued by the United States concerning 
counter-narcotics in Burma. This chapter will be separated between the singular US 
policies, and the policies enacted by influential regional and global allies, particularly 
Thailand and the United Nations.  
 
6. Chapter VI – Myanmar’s Manipulation of US Policies 
 
The sixth chapter will analyze the Myanmar regime’s manipulation of the US and 
international policies in order to continue their domestic strategies of ethnic cleansing.  
The domestic policies of Myanmarization, a further analysis of the dual shadow and overt 
economies in the country, as well as the military cease-fire treaty systems will all be 
analyzed in the context of US counter-narcotic policies and sanctions. 
The chapter will complete with an analysis of how an overt and shadow economy 
has become a vital factor in the manipulation of international policies to further the ethnic 
cleansing planned by the Myanmar regime.  
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7.  Chapter VII – Conclusion 
 
The final chapter in this thesis will summarize the main argument and the 
secondary questions.  Several policy recommendations will be highlighted along with 
potential diplomatic, economic, and military solutions. It will include a final summation 



























II. BURMESE HISTORY 
A. ANCIENT BURMESE HISTORY 
 
Ancient Burmese History, or the period leading up to the British Colonial period, 
must be analyzed in order to show that Burmese policies toward ethnic minorities pre-
dates Western rule.  In the mountainous periphery regions of the country these policies 
were established before the arrival of Western influence in the 18th century. Although 
most analysts blame the fracturing of Burma’s ethnicities on the British colonial period, 
the policies implemented by the United Kingdom during their rule were actually based on 
practices created by the Burmese kings themselves.14 
For the past one thousand years Burma has been unified by three Burmese 
dynasties. Initially, Burma was unified in this era by the Pagan Dynasty in 1044. This 
period is known as the “Golden Age” of Burma, when Theravada Buddhism, the official 
religion of Burma, was established. The Pagan dynasty maintained an independent rule 
until 1287, when Kublai Khan led a Mongol invasion into the country.15 At this time, 
Burma was fractured and the Shan rulers from the Eastern side of the country filled the 
political vacuum left by the Mongol invasion.  They then transferred the capital to the 
city of Ava. 16  However, the Shan never established total control over the country, as had 
the Burmese Pagan Dynasty, and the state remained splintered until the second Kingdom, 
the Toungoo Dynasty, was established in the fifteenth century.  
The Toungoo conquered the Shan, and wrested control from their princes through 
vicious and protracted warfare.17  Interestingly, the Toungoo Dynasty was a large, multi-
ethnic kingdom. This period of warfare would enable the Burmese to spread their rule 
across the Shan principalities in Eastern Burma, the Mon in Southern Burma, over 
Northern Thailand, and into portions of Laos.18  While much of the territory was 
                                                 
14 Fink, p. 59. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Downloaded from www.state.gov on May 1, 2006 - Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; 
Posted on August 2005. 
14 Downloaded from Encyclopedia Britannica. 
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conquered by the Burmese Kings, many of the ethnic peoples became vassals and allies 
of the Toungoo dynasty. Consequently, a divide-and-conquer system of territorial control 
was established in this time period.  The Toungoo rule lasted from 1486 until 1752, but 
the power of the empire was inconsistent in nature. The Shan Ava dynasty would rise 
again to combat the Toungoo in the late 16th century, and the Ayutthaya dynasty in 
Thailand would contest the Burmese kings for control over other Shan prince’s 
loyalties.19  
The first instance of Western influence started with Portuguese mercenaries from 
the Malaccan Maritime Provinces. These mercenaries were used in the wars between the 
Burmese and the Thai Kings.20  The British and French would soon be making similar 
inroads into mainland Southeast Asia.  This, along with the protracted wars with the 
Shan, Mon, and other cultures, brought about the fall of the Toungoo, and the rise of the 
Konbaung. The Konbaung established their rule in 1760 under Aluangpaya, a popular 
Burmese leader who fought the Shan and the Siamese Kings in the consolidation of his 
own empire. His rule was short due to his death in battle against the Siamese, but his 
children would continue the Burmese rule through this period of increasing Western 
incursion.21 
 Although Burma would solidify its sovereignty under the Konbaug Dynasty in the 
18th century, and survive a succession of Chinese invasions, the country fell to the power 
of Western colonialism by 1885 at the close of the third Anglo-Burma War.22 Burma was 
then absorbed by the British-controlled Indian Empire, and became a protectorate of the 
United Kingdom. 
 Throughout these periods, even when the Burma Dynasties were at their height of 
power, their control over the hill tracts was “…largely nominal and exercised more 
through feudal relations than territorial conquests”.23  It was the traditional basis for 
autonomous rule, which the Burmese had practiced with their empire, which had inspired 
                                                 
19 Downloaded from Encyclopedia Britannica. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Siam is the former name for the country of Thailand. In referring to Thailand prior to the 20th 
century, Siam will be used.   
22 Downloaded from Encyclopedia Britannica. 
23 Sherman, p. 227. 
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the British to maintain the same type of feudal relationship. The traditional interpretation 
of managing the border territories extends to this period of ancient Burmese history. 
“Attack seldom succeeds because it’s hard enough to find Shans to attack; but one Shan 
can usually be neutralized through the opposition of another.”24  These were the lessons 
which the British would apply to their management of Burma. 
 





From 1826 through 1885, Burma fought the British, and their Thailand allies, 
until the Konbaug Dynasty collapsed.   
 
 
Figure 1.   British Conquests during the Anglo-Burma Wars in the 18th Century 
                                                 
24 Cowell, p. 5. 
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Instead of ruling Burma directly, the British placed the country under the indirect 
rule of the British Indian Colonial government. Although the Burmese would experience 
a period of economic growth and development during this time, they would be given no 
voice in their government, and were completely disenfranchised from the political 
process.  In fact, the British colonial government was almost entirely manned by 
Indians.25  The British system of law was adopted, removing the traditional law of the 
Burmese kings. The judiciary, much like the other facets of the government, was 
removed from the control of the Burmese population.  
During the rule by the Indian Colonial Government, there were no Burma citizens 
in the Burmese military.  The Indian military leaders focused on a recruitment of Mon, 
Karen, and Chin ethnicities, which were considered ‘martial races’ in the British 
empire.26  The British saw the Burmese as inadequate soldiers, but were also concerned 
with arming the growing nationalist movements in the country.  For a short time, from 
1923 to 1937, Burma was granted a limited autonomy.  
It was during this time of oppression that the Burmese began to develop 
nationalist movements among students.  Ironically, these students had been educated 
under the new British education system. These nationalist groups tried to move into more 
and more positions of authority in the bureaucracy; however they mainly entered into the 
few positions open to the Burmese in the Colonial Army. 
 
2. Japanese Occupation 
 
The Japanese invasion into Burma gave the Burmese an opportunity to re-take 
power in their country. Upon Japanese occupation, the small number of Burmese citizens 
in the British Indian Colonial army immediately deserted to form the Burmese 
Independence Army (BIA). The Japanese, much like the British, were fearful of the 
power the BIA, but instead decided to incorporate the Burmese into their plans for the 
future of the region. Because the British forces in the Burmese theatre in World War II 
were primarily drawn from ethnic minorities, the Japanese sought to undermine those 
                                                 
25 The estimated census number of Indians in Burma had increased to one million out of 14.5 million 
in 1931 – Johari, p. 36. 
26 Selth, p. 9. 
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forces by consolidating power among the Burmese.27  The Japanese re-distributed the 
3000 Burmese soldiers from the BIA into the Burmese Defense Army (BDA). Next they 
created a national war college for officers.  Finally, they established the Nationalist 
leader, , as the Minister of Defense. A BDA Battalion officer named Ne Win was then 
elevated to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Both  and Ne Win had been 
members of Burmese Nationalist movements prior to the arrival of the Japanese. 
 The Burmese “puppet” government established by  and the Japanese was 
comprised of ethnically Burmese citizens, and was the first opportunity for the Burmese 
to regain self-rule, albeit under the Japanese umbrella, since the British colonial 
occupation began in the eighteenth century.28  The retaliation against the Karen 
minorities who had been raised to positions of prominence among the Indian Colonial 
administrations was immediate.29    
 The Burmese would not oppose the overriding Japanese control throughout the 
war, even with the Burma theatre becoming an important part of the War. However, 
when  lead the BDA to fight alongside the Axis in 1945, upon witnessing the weakening 
of the Japanese regime against the Allies, he decided to join them. With the surrender of 
the Japanese, the British were in a precarious position as to how to deal with the rise of 
Burmese nationalism  
 
C. BURMESE INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE (1948-1962) 
 
On January 4th, 1948, Burma gained its independence from the United Kingdom 
(UK). A constitution was established, setting up a bicameral legislature, a prime minister, 
and a supporting executive cabinet.30  A truly representative government was established, 
including the representation and enfranchisement of the multiple ethnic minorities in the 
mountainous regions around the country.  Furthermore, Aung San, the “Father of 
Burmese Independence,” negotiated deals with the UK which allowed him the power to 
                                                 
27 In 1925, the Indian government declared recruits would only come from Kachin, Chin, and Karen 
races - Selth, p. 9. 
28 Selth, p. 8. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Vaclev – p. 1. 
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broker the Burmese independence.31  He initially made deals with the various ethnic 
minorities in the periphery of Burma. The Shan, Kachin, Kaya, Kayin, and Chin 
minorities were granted a degree of regional autonomy in their territories with the option 
to secede at a later date, if they felt they were not fully represented by the Union of 
Burma.32 ’s goal was to maintain national unity until the fledgling democratic 
government could secure power. Unfortunately, Aung San was assassinated in 1949, and 
his coalition collapsed immediately.33  
From the moment of Aung San’s assassination, the Union of Burma was beset by 
internal strife from social, political, and conflicting ethnic groups. First, the fall of the 
Kuomintang (KMT) government in China in 1949 resulted in a mass exodus of 
Nationalist forces from the Yunnan Province into the Shan State in Northeastern 
Burma.34  The KMT were based in Northeastern Burma and launched assaults into China 
with covert aid form the United States’ military.35  Then, Mao Zedong, as the leader of 
Communist China, used these incursions as an excuse to invade Burma in order to hunt 
the KMT forces. Not surprisingly, the Burmese army was not strong enough to defend 
these borders, especially when they were dealing with internal conflicts against ethnic 
insurgents.  
The young and extremely small Burmese Army was forced to face a country 
which was fractured along ethnic, religious, and colonial lines, and heavily armed 
following years of global conflict.36  “Tats”, or pocket armies led by local politicians, 
communist insurgents, exiled Chinese KMT nationalists, ethnic minority reel armies, and 
numerous criminal elements were all operating during this time period.37  When the 
Burmese army would occupy territories, like the Shan State region, where they fought to 
                                                 
31 Selth, p. 8. 
32 1947 Panlong agreement gave these ethnicities “full autonomy in internal administration for the 
Frontier Areas. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Selth, p. 11. 
35 Fink, p. 24. 
36 General Ne Win commanded only 2000 soldiers in 1949 – Selth , p. 11. 
37 Ibid. 
19 
remove the KMT, they would enact revenge on the Shan villagers.38  Similar reports 
were recorded in the Karenni State, as well as among Mon and Arakanese nationalists.39  
Despite internal strife in the Union of Burma, there was a significant amount of 
strength behind the future of the country. In 1935, Burma became the leading rice 
exporter in the world.40  A strong infrastructure built by the British colonial period, and 
the Japanese occupation, gave the Burmese considerable opportunity to progress as a 
political society.41  Furthermore, the education system in Burma had been strongly 
supported by the British during their rule, which provided Burma a pool of educated and 
skilled human capital.42  Unfortunately, this worked against the Burmese democratic 
system, instead of supporting its growth.  
The forays into a developmental state with free education and land reform were 
met head-on with greed and corruption. Those who had risen to power were not prepared 
to share their gains.  The prominence and unity the Tatmadaw developed as being the 
first national institution of the new country originally established their reputation as the 
saviors of the country.43  But the most devastating blow to the Union of Burma came in 
the assassination of  in 1948 just before the new cabinet could meet.44  This left a void 
which was unable to be filled by any other Burmese leader, especially one who could 
command respect from the multitude of different ethnicities and maintain support from 
the majority Burmese population.  
On January 31, 1949, Karen rebels angry over the inability of the new Burmese 
government to define state boundaries for the Karen Union, turned against the 
Tatmadaw.45 Other ethnic militaries would rise up to join the fights against the Burmese. 
Some rose in anger over the government’s refusal to honor the Panglong agreement, 
while others simply struck back against the regime’s vicious exploitation of their 
                                                 
38 Fink, p. 24. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Fink, p. 32. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Johari, p. 31. 
44 Burma Primer, p. 6. 
45 Fink, p. 24. 
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people.46  The Tatmadaw, as former members of the BDA and BIA, simply feared the 
armed ethnic militias around the country.  
In 1958, Prime Minister U Nu turned to the military, and requested the Tatmadaw 
restore order to the country. General Ne Win, the senior general of the Tatmadaw took 
control of the Burmese government and maintained control until the national elections in 
1960. In 1960, Prime Minister U Nu and a civilian government were restored to power. In 
1962, General Ne Win led a coup d’etat, and the military took total control of the 
government in Burma.  
 
D. 1962 COUP D’ETAT – 1990 MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS 
 
On March 2, 1962, General Ne Win, Commanding General of the Tatmadaw, led 
a coup d’etat which overthrew the democratically elected Burmese government. General 
Win immediately removed the constitution, dissolved civil society, and placed a 
Revolutionary Council (RC) in charge of the political economy.47 The RC quickly 
adopted the “Burmese way to Socialism” and began to remove anyone in government 
who opposed the Tatmadaw.48 In addition, 2000 members of the civilian government 
were replaced with military personnel. The press was nationalized and the freedom to 
interact with foreigners and move around the country was seriously curtailed.49  In 1964, 
the Law to Protect National Solidarity was enacted, which made all political parties in the 
country illegal except for the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).50  
Between 1963 and 1965, all national banks, industries, and large shops were 
nationalized ruining hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Indian merchants.51  
Consequently this prompted a mass emigration of the human capital which had been built 
                                                 
46 Shan were struck by the Tatmadaw military and raided for materials under the auspices of “fighting 
Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalists hiding in The Shan State Region after the fall of the KMT Regime in 
China to the Communists. 
47 Fink, p. 32. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Johari, p. 53. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Fink, p. 32. 
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up through the British colonial era. Within six years, the Burmese economy was in a 
shambles and the first steps toward a “black market economy” began.  
 This was not the only problem.  The exportation of rice dropped from 1.8 million 
tons in 1963 to .3 million tons in 1968.52  The Cooperatives built by the military failed, 
all independent newspapers were absorbed by the government, and Chinese merchants 
became the sole source of economic goods. Though the military was becoming 
unpopular, General Ne Win was able to deflect the failings of the economy onto the black 
market merchants, who were primarily Chinese, and the resulting food riots of 1967 were 
directed against them.53   
The rise to power of General Ne Win prompted an immediate response from the 
ethnic minorities in the periphery of the country. Because they were immediately 
disenfranchised by the rise of the military, they declared autonomy in their regions. By 
1961, other minorities were following the Karen’s lead by establishing their own military 
forces and the Shan and the Mon also began to develop forces to defend themselves 
against the Rangoon government.  
On January 3, 1974, after General Ne Win had ruled Burma for twelve years, he 
established a new constitution and renamed the country as the Socialist Republic of the 
Union of Burma.54  The constitution officially renamed the country and established the 
sole rule of the BSPP in Burma.  In addition, a greater suppression of freedoms and civil 
liberties were enacted by the government. Worker strikes, student protests, and religious 
petitions from the Buddhist monks opposed to the military rule were all suppressed 
violently and cruelly.55  
Twenty-six years of economic mismanagement by General Ne Win’s “Burmese 
Way to Socialism” led the Burmese economy to collapse. The culmination of the 
Tatmadaw’s rule arrived with the August 8th, 1988 massacres of non-violent protestors 
against the military junta’s rule. The ever weakening economy in Burma finally crashed 
in 1987 and the kyat had lost all monetary value, eliminating the savings of millions of 
Burmese. As a result, there were food shortages throughout the country, and people were 
                                                 
52 Fink, p. 32. 
53 Ibid., p. 35. 
54 Johari, p. 58. 
55 Ibid. 
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starving. University students and Buddhist monks began to lead non-violent protests in 
the capital city of Rangoon calling for the reform and a regime change.  
 On the 8th of August, 1988, military forces were deployed to deal with the 
protestors; violence ensued, killing thousands of protestors.56  Not surprisingly, the 
massacre attracted considerable international responses; however these actions did not 
dissuade the junta from continuing with its violent reprisals against the democratic 
protestors. On September 18th, the Burmese military junta deposed the Burmese Socialist 
Program Party (BSPP) and abolished the constitution.57  The government was soon 
renamed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The army was 
dispatched to quell disorder, and an estimated additional 3000 protestors were killed.  
The massacre inspired Suu Kyi, the daughter of , to make a speech against the 
military’s rule in Burma, and emerged as the new leader of the democratic movement in 
Burma. She rose to the leadership of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and was 
quickly placed under arrest by the ruling military junta. To prevent an outright rebellion, 
the military announced a multi-party election to be held in 1990. 
 The first multi-party election coincided with the first cease-fires established 
between the various ethnic paramilitaries surrounding Burma. On May 27th, 1990, an 
election was held, and despite significant controls implemented against the NLD and 
other non-SLORC parties in the election, the results turned against the ruling military 
regime. The NLD won a landslide 389 out of the 485 parliamentary seats.  Unfortunately 
the NLD would never take a single seat in parliament, and the bloodshed which 
intensified on the 8-8-88 massacres would only grow.58 
 
E. 1990 – 2001 CEASEFIRES AND THE RISE OF MYANMAR 
 
Due to the poor results of the elections, a deterioration of international public 
opinion, and an economy in dire straits, a new direction was taken by the Junta.  The fall 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had left the Communist Party of Burma 
                                                 
56 Vaclev, p. 2. 
57 Burma Primer, p. 6. 
58 Ibid. 
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(CPB) without direct support. The various ethnic paramilitaries whom had fought for 
their people on the side of the communists were now forced to find other means of 
support and survival. The small subsidy of illegal narcotics which had been used by both 
the communists, and the ethnic warlords, had increased to unprecedented levels.59  
 International public opinion turned severely against the military Junta after the 
suppression of the election results. The Western world felt no reason to restrain their 
views on the human rights violations being practiced by the Junta. Without a Communist 
threat for the US to focus on, there was no restraint to focus on the human rights 
violations being perpetrated by the Myanmar regime. Also, Burma has risen to become 
the leading exporter of illicit opium and heroin in the world. This presented Burma with a 
unique situation of suddenly being under the “microscope” of international opinion, 
particularly from the Western powers.  
 The military Junta began to implement various delaying tactics to placate the 
international community while the government began to plan their next moves against the 
threats to their rule.60  In order to inspire national identities with the former Burmese 
Empires, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) changed the name of 
the country from Burma to Myanmar.  In addition, all of the traditional spellings were 
restored, replacing the Westernized pronunciations.61  
 In 1997, the military Junta changed its name from the SLORC to the State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC). This was essentially a public relations move as no 
significant change was made to the political institutions run by the new SPDC.  In fact, 
four of the generals who maintained power in the SLORC became four of the nineteen 
council members in the SPDC. Most importantly, the leading General Than Swe rose to 
control the Tatmadaw, be a council member of the SPDC, and Prime Minister of the 
country.  
 The period of military rule following the 1990 elections in Burma, had been a 
period of promises and concessions to the international community, which were quickly 
                                                 
59 This is when Burma rose to become the world’s largest producer of opium. A position it would hold 
until the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 would allow opium production to sky-rocket in 
that country. 
60 Fink, p. 70. 
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broken and ignored. g Suu Kyi is still incarcerated, and her periods of release are usually 
short, followed by vicious violent reprisals to anyone who publicly supports her.62  
Moreover, the period immediately following the election resulted in the signing of 
various cease-fire treaties with the regional insurgent militaries within Burma. Insurgent 
forces which had been fighting the Tatmadaw forces since 1962, like the United State Wa 
Army (UWSA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), 
entered into agreements which gave them autonomy in their territories in return for 
certain economic and defense alliance concessions.63  
 In 1997, Burma joined the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a 
regional security cooperative with ten other member-states in mainland and maritime 
Southeast Asia.  Despite the protests of Western governments, ASEAN worked to bring 
Burma and the illegal regime into the fold of the regional community.64 They had hoped 
interaction would catalyze some change in the country.65 However, this was far from the 
actual outcome. 
 Even among ASEAN members, issues continually degraded the Myanmar 
regime’s relationship with the other member nation-states. From February through May 
2001, border conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Thailand Third Army erupted with 
artillery barrages which were regularly fired between the two countries.66  This marked 
the first time armed conflict arose between two ASEAN member-nations. 
 With the isolation from the majority of the international community, the Burmese 
leaders turned from their traditional relationships, and began increasing their mutual 
relations with China. Today, China accounts for the majority of all Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and trade in Burma. China is not the sole investor, and like other allies 
of the US, such as Japan and France, many countries still interact with the Myanmar 
regime. This protection from China is not giving the Myanmar regime the enough 
security to remove their own xenophobia towards the rest of the international community 
though. 
                                                 
62 Fink, p. 80. 
63 Ibid. 
64 US and the UK leading the European Union (EU) in particular. 
65 Acharya. 
66 Chouvy “Drugs and War Destabilize Thai-Myanmar Border Region”, www.geopium.com. 2002. 
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 In the past few years,the Rangoon regime has moved it’s capital two hours to the 
North, in a “Scorched Earth” policy reminiscent of Hitler and the Nazi high command in 
the last days of World War II. The attempts to shift the capital North to Pyinmana, 
despite significant costs, logistics concerns, and loss of international credibility, gives 
weight to the bunker mentality which has developed among the regime in recent years. 
The current dynamic in and around Burma, within which the counter-narcotic and 
economic sanctions interact, must be explored before further analysis of their policies can 
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III. CURRENT MYANMAR 
A. DOMESTIC  
 
Domestic actors in Burma today include the Tatmadaw military regime, the 
National League for Democracy (NLD), insurgent military forces, and a general 
population which is distributed over 135 different nationalities. Each of these separate 
components must be analyzed before the whole dynamic of Burmese socio-politics can 




a. Tatmadaw Collective Character 
 
From its earliest beginnings, the Tatmadaw reign has been characterized 
by a powerful xenophobia. This fear of being removed from power has been the basis for 
most decisions made by the military junta since taking control in 1962. Great Britain, 
which annexed Burma completely into its empire in 1885 and placed the Burmese under 
Indian Colonial government rule, creating a powerful sense of paranoia concerning 
external influences threatening Burmese autonomy. This British domination influenced 
and cultivated the modern Burmese nationalism which eventually freed the country from 
external rule, but the paranoia’s original source is much farther back in the country’s 
history. 
There is an extensive history of external threats to Burmese self-rule 
which stretches back beyond the days of British colonialism. In the past thousand years, 
Burma was invaded by Mongols, Chinese, Shan, and Siamese armies long before 
Western colonialism intruded into Southeast Asia. In truth, Burma has always been a 
crossroads country among great powers.67 
                                                 
67 The Siamese Kings became the Thailand Kings. 
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Andrew Selth describes Burma’s centralization in his book Burma’s 
Armed Forces: Power Without Glory: 
[Burma] Is the place where South, Southeast and East Asia meet, and 
where the dominant cultures of these three sub-regions compete for 
influence. In Samuel Huntington’s terms it lays across the fault lines 
between three major civilizations, those of the Hindus, Buddhists, and 
Confucians68.  
With its foray into self-rule during the beginning of the Cold War, Burma 
became a focal point for the rivalry between the US and the USSR, despite its proclaimed 
neutrality.69 Even with the end of the Cold War, and the powerful effects of the US-led 
multilateral sanctions, Burma can still be characterized by its position between two 
regional strategic giants: India and China.  
Burma shares a 1463 kilometer long border with India and a 2185 
kilometer long border with China. Both of these countries possess nuclear power, large 
militaries, and have strong connections to numerous ethnic minorities within Burma.70 
With large mountain ranges preventing easy East to West travel, Burma’s isolation in the 
central lowlands have shaped the character of the military junta’s fear of outsiders. Since 
the majority of the outside influences which crossed these mountains were military 
invasions, Burmese leaders viewed any influence from across these ranges as a threat. 
For the last thousand years, Burma has been characterized by “wars, internecine conflict, 
and social upheaval” internally, which only further increases the fear of unknowns 
influencing events in the country. This psychological character is important in 
understanding the Tatmadaw’s motivations.71 
An yet, in spite of the regional powers which surround Burma, no country 
has invaded or threatened the regime directly with invasion since the country gained 
                                                 
68 Selth, p. 3. 
69 Ibid. 
70 60% of the Wa live in the Yunnan province in Burma. 
71 Ibid, p. 7. 
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independence in 1948.72 Instead, the consistent threats faced by the Tatmadaw are 
internal: the numerous insurgent forces and the national democratic movement. The true 
threats to the Tatmadaw rule can be summarized by the country’s current national 
objectives:  
• The non-disintegration of the Union 
• The non-disintegration of national solidarity 
• The perpetuation of national sovereignty.73 
 
It is apparent that the Tatmadaw will do anything within its power to 
achieve these three national objectives. Since these objectives are survival-oriented, any 
action can be justified by the Tatmadaw as necessary for survival. The fear of internal 
threats now reinforces the Tatmadaw’s fear of foreign intervention into their ongoing 
conflicts with these ethnic minorities within their territory.  
The Tatmadaw lives in constant fear of an UN-led multilateral incursion 
into Burma, especially since popular support for the invasion would come from so many 
directions. Nations and ethnicities which are usually opposed to each other can find a 
common ground on the issue of human rights suppression in Burma74.  
The violation of human rights in Burma is not a new subject. The 
Commander of Saudi Arabian Forces during the 1991 invasion to liberate Kuwait, Prince 
Khaled Bin Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, called for a UN intervention into Burma while 
visiting Bangladesh in 1992. In anger over the violent suppression of the Muslim 
Minority in Burma, the Prince stated that the UN should liberate the Rohingya, just like 
Kuwait.75  
Yet in spite of such powerful rhetoric, most countries prefer to preserve 
issues of sovereignty and non-interference. For example, Pakistan supported the State 
                                                 
72 The Chinese assaults against the KMT in the Shan State Region were with the permission of the 
Burmese Government. This also includes the Thai –Burma Border conflict and resulting remarks made by 
Prime Minister Thaksin during the 2003 Thailand War on Drugs. Those remarks were directed towards the 
Wa. 
73 Ibid, p. 30. 
74 Muslims, Indians, and Chinese have all been suppressed in Burma in the recent history. 
75 Selth, p. 41. 
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Law and Restoration Council’s (SLORC) position in the suppression of the students 
during the 8-8-88 massacres in order to preserve economic relations with the regime.76 
Even Malaysia, a long-time critic of human rights abuses against the Muslim Rohingya in 
Burma, quieted their diplomatic censures after Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) opened 
in the country in 1997.77 
For the Tatmadaw, the most troubling international event in recent years 
must be the UN intervention into the Southeast Asian nation-state of Indonesia in support 
of the creation of the new country of East Timor.78 Despite being a founding member of 
ASEAN, a founding member of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War, and a 
powerful proponent of non-interference, Indonesia agreed to a multilateral peace-keeping 
force to replace their position in their territory.  
United Nations Forces East Timor (UNFET) included Australia, South 
Korea, Singapore, and Thailand.79 ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference known as 
“Asian solutions for Asian problems” was superseded by an international condemnation 
of the human rights violations being perpetrated by the Indonesian government.80 For the 
first time since the US presence in Vietnam, an international coalition of military forces 
was sent to an Asian country to maintain order and create a new nation-state from within 
the sovereign territory of another country. This worries the Tatmadaw leadership 
significantly.  
The Tatmadaw’s fear of foreign incursions into their internal affairs 





                                                 
76 Ibid – This was believed to be a counter to India in the international arena, who came out in support 
of the NLD and the pro-democracy movement. 
77 Acharya, p. 112. 
78 Selth, p. 42. 
79 Acharya, p. 59.  
80 Ibid. 
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b. Tatmadaw Absolute Political and Economic Control 
 
The military has absolute control over the country of Burma. The military 
regime has maintained this control since the 1962 coup d’etat led by General Ne Win. 
Although leadership has changed during the more than forty years of rule, it has remained 
consolidated among a small cadre of military generals. From General Ne Win’s period of 
rule to the current one under the control of General Than Swe, the power has not spread 
far beyond four or five generals. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 
consists entirely of serving and retired military officers. Essentially, the state and the 
military are homogeneous.81  
The government is largely staffed with retired Tatmadaw officers loyal to 
the SPDC.82 Very little power resides in the government’s bureaucracy. The judicial 
system is under the control of the military as well, removing any hope for a fair trial, if a 
trial is even conducted.83 The service portions of the government, whether education, 
energy, or health ministries, are all forced to comply with Tatmadaw’s needs before any 
other.84  
The political party which represents the Tatmadaw is the National Union 
Party (NUP).85 Although the NUP was the loser in the 1990 elections against the NLD, it 
is impossible to hold a government position in Rangoon today without being a member.   
It is in the economy where the most important power-centralizing controls 
are maintained by the regime. The Tatmadaw has complete control over the economy, as 
well as the political institutions. The absolute control of the country’s economy by the 
Tatmadaw is the main reason for the continually failing economy. The lack of 
independent market development, state controlled industries, and inconsistent economic 
vision have devastated the overall economy. These practices have created a system of 
                                                 
81 Burma Primer, p. 35. 
82 Currently, there are 32 out of 38 ministerial-level positions are active duty or retired military - 





corruption, failed infrastructure, and economic misalignment which prevents any profit 
from reaching individuals outside of the military architecture.  
The Tatmadaw’s control is currently centered in two companies: the 
Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) and the Myanmar Economic 
Corporation (MEC) who coordinate economic distribution through the country. Another 
organization, the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA), which is 
controlled by the SPDC, is also involved heavily in the country’s economy.86 All of these 
organizations require NUP membership, as well as a Tatmadaw military background to 
become managing associates.  
The UMEH, in a 1995-1996 report, summarized its purpose as “to support 
military personnel and their families” and “to try and become the main logistics and 
support organization for the military”.87 Only military members can be shareholders in 
UMEH.88The MEC’s purpose is to funnel the expenses of the military over to the private 
sector and away from the public sector. This economic mismanagement would be enough 
to cripple the rule of the Tatmadaw, except for their control of another vital agency in the 
political economy.    
Another important facet of the Tatmadaw’s economic dictatorship is 
management of the Myanmar Investment Council (MIC), which controls all FDI in 
Burma.89 Any resources coming into the country can be diverted by the junta in any 
fashion it wants. This ensures no economic banking decisions concerning the flow of FDI 
into the country are made outside of the SPDC’s decision-making process.  
The regime also possesses total control of the press in the country 
today.90 The “New Light of Myanmar” is the country’s main newspaper, which the  
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Vaclev, p. 7. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, p. 11. 
90 Selth, p. 32. 
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regime uses todeliver its political rhetoric to the general population. With the ability to 
censure the press, SPDC can ensure that the newspaper only produces what the SPDC 
council wants it to publish.  
Education is totally under the control of the Tatmadaw as well. Although 
Burma had one of the highest literacy rates in Asia in the 1940s and 1950s, it has 
degraded severely under the Tatmadaw’s rule.91 For example, in 1999, only four percent 
of the total budget was spent on education.92 This suppression of education exists for 
three very important reasons: the ruling Generals distrust education since they are not 
very well educated themselves. The Generals fear that more education will result in more 
democratic protests, and the Generals do not want to waste military funds on education.93  
This preservation of order, within their own military structure and among 
the varied population, is the main reason for the regional structuring of their forces. 
 
c. Tatmadaw Structure and Regional Distribution 
 
The Country’s political structure mirrors the military regional 
infrastructure.94 There are fourteen different regional commands and twelve different 
regional political districts. There are constant re-shuffles of regional commanders, which 
seem to regularly occur with the intention of preventing commanders from establishing 
powerful connections in their areas of responsibilities.95  
Recently, the Tatmadaw established a separate layer in their chain of 
command known as the Bureau of Special Operations (BSO).96 The BSO regional 
chief’s authority extends to military, social, political, and economic control throughout 
                                                 
91 1995 UNICEF reports on Children and Women in Myanmar estimate a 39% rate of literacy – it is 
also important to note that levels of illiteracy are much higher in the remote ethnic minority regions Fink, p. 
174. 
92 Referring to Win Thien’s ‘Learning in Limbo’ in The Irrawaddy May 1999 - Fink, p. 174. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Burma Primer, p. 38. 
95 Ibid, p. 39. 
96 Ibid, p. 40. 
34 
their territory.97 This is significant because it centralizes the chain of command to a 
“middle four” who answer directly to the SPDC Council.98  
The Tatmadaw also operates the only currently open and functioning 
university in the country: the Defense Services Academy at Pyin Oo Lwin.99 The 
Defense Services Academy has increased its overall intake of students in 2000, raising 
the size of the graduating classes to 1500. With the elimination of all other university 
education in the country, this increase in military education reduces all options for 
advancement in Burma to the military.  
Currently, the Tatmadaw numbers an estimated 400,000 soldiers, double 
the number of men the military possessed in 1988. There is also a 72,000 strong 
paramilitary police force.100 And yet, this count does not include the number of military-
trained Burmese personnel in the country at any time, which numbers around 12 million. 
The goal of the Tatmadaw is to reach the number of 500,000 soldiers.101 Although none 
of its neighbors in Southeast Asia has a comparable military, the Tatmadaw-controlled 
military is continually increasing. Burma now possesses the largest military in all of 
Southeast Asia. 
 
d. Tatmadaw Leadership  
 
The current Governmental Chief of Staff, Senior General Than Swe, is 
also the Chairman of the SPDC.102 He has held this position since April 23, 1992. In 
truth, he has held a position of great authority long before this date, as he was previously 
the Chairman of the SLORC from 1989 until the name change in 1992.103 As head of 
the SPDC and the executive branch, all cabinet members report directly to him. As the 
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Senior General, Than Swe has consolidated more power around him since 2003 with the 
sudden restructuring of the SPDC membership.104  
The current Prime Minister is General Soe Win, having replaced his 
predecessor Prime Minister Khin Nyut.105 Prime Minister Soe Win’s appointment to the 
position has been an important signal of the future intentions of the SPDC ruling council. 
As a leading member of the Tatmadaw, General Soe Win was a principle architect of the 
August and September 1988 Massacres.106 General Soe Win is also considered the 
architect behind the 2003 assaults on Aung San Suu Kyi.107 General Soe Win is best 
known for his statement that “the SPDC not only won’t talk to the NLD, but also would 
never hand over power to the NLD".108  
 
2. National League for Democracy (NLD) 
 
The National League for Democracy (NLD) is the premier opposition to the 
ruling Tatmadaw regime within the country. In the free elections held on May 27, 1990, 
the NLD won 398 out of the 485 seats in the one-house parliament. The ruling generals 
of the Tatmadaw ignored the results of the election, and imprisoned the leader of the 
NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi. 
Aung San Suu Kyi is currently, despite her imprisonment, the Secretary General 
of the NLD.109 In 1991, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her non-violent 
efforts to restore democracy to Burma. She has been imprisoned for the majority of her 
time in Burma since the election, and has been allowed out only on rare, controlled 
occasions.  
                                                 
104 Burma Primer, p. 38. 
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The NLD was fractured by the immediate repression brought about following the 
results of the 1990 election. Most of the winning parliament members were imprisoned 
without trial, their only crime being democratically elected instead of Tatmadaw-backed 
candidates.  
In 2002, the Tatmadaw seemed to be finally compromising with the NLD. Aung 
San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest for the first time in thirteen years. She 
immediately began meeting with her NLD allies and touring the country to spread her 
political message. NLD offices were allowed to re-open, and the membership of the NLD 
began to rise again. After a full year of recruiting, democratic education, and 
centralization, the NLD began to grow to the size it maintained in 1990 during the 
elections. This was the time the SPDC decided to remove the NLD’s power base, as well 
as the credibility of Aung San Suu Kyi, one last time.  
In the spring of 2003, the Tatmadaw once again began a campaign of repression 
against the NLD.110 On May 30, 2003, a group of pro-military protestors attacked  Suu 
Kyi’s NLD convoy while she was traveling around the Sagaing Division. The Depayin 
Massacre has been linked to General Than Swe, the Military junta chief.111 Dozens of 
NLD supporters were killed, and Aung San Suu Kyi, along with her deputy, former 
General Tin Oo, were returned to house arrest. The 485 member legislature has still not 
convened since its election in 1990.  
Today, the NLD, despite being fractured by years of violence, imprisonment, and 
suppression, is still active in Burma. The Members of Committee Representing People’s 
(CRPP) are an active group of NLD supporters who are trying to represent the elected 
members of parliament who were imprisoned by the military junta following the 1990 
elections. Aung Shwe is the current Chairperson of the CRPP, and operates in the 
Rangoon region.112 
The Depayin Massacre on 30 May 2003 was a severe blow to the NLD, causing 
the newly formed NLD to be struck a fatal blow113. NLD members were branded as 
causing insurrection, and the NLD infrastructure was shut down by the Tatmadaw in 
                                                 





much the same manner as the 8-8-88 massacres. Any NLD members who came out of 
hiding to campaign for democracy in the past year were tracked down the Tatmadaw and 
eliminated.   
An important distinction which should be made about the NLD is that it is 
primarily a democratic political party for the Burmese. Although the NLD received 
considerable amount of support during the election from Burma’s ethnic minorities in the 
voting, there is no real guarantee that the restoration of the NLD to power would 
“safeguard minority rights”.114 According to Christina Fink, who studied Burmese life 
under the Tatmadaw in her book: Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule, the 
Burmese pro-democracy supporters are not particularly sympathetic to the ethnic 
nationalists’ demands for autonomy, which they perceive as potentially leading to the 
break-up of the country.115 To this day, this distinction is one that the Tatmadaw makes 
in its dealings with the NLD and the ethnic insurgents, but one that international agencies 
and countries do not always make in their policy choices.  
 
3. Ethnic Populations 
 
There are 135 ethnic minorities in Burma today. Thirty-two percent of the total 
population in Burma is considered ethnic minorities.116  
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116 Current population estimates place the total population at 48-52 million. The lack of a census from 
the Burmese government in recent years is the reason for the estimates. 
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Figure 2.   Burma’s Ethnic Distribution 
 
Although the human rights repression is severe against all of the minorities in the 
country, since this research focuses on the misalignment of US counter-narcotic policies 
by the Myanmar regime, this thesis will focus mainly on two specific ethnicities: the 




The largest ethnic minority in Burma are the Shan. Approximately eight 
percent of the total population in Burma is Shan.117  The Northeastern region of Burma 
is the Shan State Region. The Shan Plateau region is also the territory of the only non-
Burman ethnicity which also ruled the Burmese lowlands in the past thousand years.118  
The Shan plateau was described by the British during their occupation of 
Burma, as a “fluid mosaic of petty princedoms” squeezed between the greater 
civilizations of Burma, Thailand, and China, yet maintained a cultural independence.119  
                                                 
117 www.cia.gov/worldfactbook/ - 9% of the Burmese population is Shan. This equals about 4 million 
per recent census surveys. The Karen is the second largest ethnic minority with approximately 7% of the 
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118 Encyclopedia Britannica. 
119 Cowell, p. 3. 
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The Shan’s whole existence has been in the shadow of much greater 
powers and empires. “Under constant pressure from stronger neighbors, the Shans have 
perfected a chameleon-like process of adjustment to military and political power”.120 The 
Shan never cultivated opium for wealth and profit, but for subsistence and survival.121  
The Shan continually tried to limit opium production, but their avenues of 
alternated production were less than ideal: Submission to Chinese communists, 
submission to the SLORC Burmese Way to Socialism, and a lack of human capital and 
natural resources outside of opium production made any attempts to develop 
independently a near impossibility. While facing constant invasions from the Tatmadaw 
forces, this meant the Shan had no avenue outside of the cultivation and trafficking of 
opium, to survive.   
Currently the largest of the political entities representing the Shan is the 
Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). This political entity is not able to 
speak for the full Shan nation, and many different factions have developed, fallen, and 
surrendered over the many years of warfare with the Myanmar regime.  
Today the Shan are fractured and fighting for their survival under an 
onslaught of genocide and ethnic cleansing policies from the Tatmadaw. The Shan are 
also lacking in support from the Thailand government. The Shan refugees who have 
escaped to Thailand have been repatriated back to the Rangoon regime. Thailand also 
refuses to allow the Shan to set up refugee camps like the displaced Kachin and Karen 




The Wa are an ancient tribal hill people, numbering close to 1 million 
people. Approximately 400,000 Wa reside in the Northeastern Shan State in Burma, 
while the remaining 600,000 exist in the Yunnan province in China. The current leader of 
                                                 
120 Cowell, p. 8. 
121 Usually opium from the Shan State were grown for trade – food, goods, etc. – Cowell, p. 14. 
122 Downloaded from www.shanland.org on January 23, 2006. Refugee research publications.  
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the Wa is Bao Yu-Xiang.123 Although it is very difficult to attain direct information 
concerning Bao, it is maintained that he is the leading political leader for the United Wa 
Solidarity Party (UWSP), as well as the chief narcotics warlord in the Wa region of the 
Shan State.  
The Wa have a history of changing sides for the sake of survival. Since the 
time of British Colonialism in Burma, the Wa have operated as Proxy warriors for the 
Allies during WWII, guerillas for the Chinese Communists, and independent soldiers for 
their own war for autonomy and liberation.124 The Wa do this to survive in a treacherous 
region of the world, where they have been hunted and persecuted for their race for 
centuries.  
The Wa live in a fractured existence. The Wa in the Shan region reside in 
Burma but use Chinese power, phone services, and postal codes. The lack of 
infrastructure support from the Myanmar regime has separated them from the majority of 
the outside world. When a recent Japanese author traveled to meet with Wa tribal leaders, 
he had to create new words to explain Japan, which he explained as the “Ocean 
Chinese”.125 This isolation has provided the Wa with the convenience of easily shifting 
allegiance to whomever will support them next.  
 
4. Ethnic Insurgencies 
 
Since the earlier portions of this chapter focused on the Wa and Shan, the study of 
the ethnic paramilitaries will focus on the two main paramilitary forces of these ethnic 
groups.  
 
a. Shan State Army (SSA) 
 
The paramilitary arm of the ethnic Shan is the Shan State Army (SSA). 
The Mong Tai Army (MTA) was another of the paramilitary forces which operated on 
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the behalf of the Shan population.126Unfortunately, even within specific ethnic groups in 
Burma, there is little cooperation between insurgent forces. This is mainly due to the 
tribal warlord nature of these forces which has resulted from the mountainous geography, 
as well as the exploitative nature of the narcotics trade itself. 
The SSA signed a cease-fire with the Tatmadaw on September 2, 1989. 
The UWSA has been fighting a proxy war against the SSA, and other Shan insurgent 
forces. This conflict between these two insurgent forces is characteristic of the many 
ethnic paramilitary forces fighting for control of narcotics trade, territory, and autonomy 
in Northeastern Burma. With numerous ethnicities all fighting on their own in order to 
survive, many conflicts for resources have occurred over the past fifty years of conflict. 
The unique relationships of the military forces within the Wa are characteristic of the new 




The paramilitary arm of the ethnic Wa in Northeastern Burma is the 
United Wa State Army (UWSA). Currently the UWSA support their forces through illicit 
narcotics trade.127 The UWSA is currently estimated to be about 15-20 thousand 
personnel strong. The current leader of the UWSA is Bao You-Xiang, who is also the 
leader of the political arm of the Wa, the UWSP.128  
The power of the UWSA is entirely centered in Bao.129 According to 
statements made by various Wa refugees escaping form the relocations and starvations 
perpetrated by the UWSA: 
He and his brothers and their cronies are the ones responsible for the 
opium growing and the production of methamphetamines. If he really wants to halt the 
drug business in the Wa region, he can do it easily through his own competence. He has 
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the money, the intelligence, and ruthlessness acquired to accomplish the job. But up to 
now, he has used all these to keep power and money for himself.130  
This is a description very reminiscent of the Tatmadaw leadership in the 
SPDC. Bao has been expanding his legal wealth. Bao owns animal farms, factories, 
hotels, jewelry, mines, real estate, and even an airline. Bao is also a major investor in the 
Myanmar Mayflower Bank and Asia Wealth Bank.131 
The other important leader in the UWSA, who controls the Southern 
Military Region of the UWSA, and the suspected Wa side of the architected cease-fires 
and illicit narcotics agreements with the Tatmadaw, is Wei Hseuh-Kang.132 Wei is a 
Chinese Wa, who escaped to Burma with the KMT. Wei’s rise to power was based on his 
education, connections in China, and his ability to establish illegal trafficking 
connections with Western criminal organizations.133 Wei was also a deputy of Khun Sa, 
the notorious Shan drug-lord of the MTA. It is believed that Wei’s betrayal of Khun Sa 
was one of the causes of his downfall.134  
Wei was indicted in the United States in 1993 for the illegal trafficking of 
heroin.135 The US Department of State has offered a two million dollar reward for his 
capture and Thailand has sentenced him to a death penalty for his crimes.136 Although he 
has been threatened with arrest if he returns to any city in central Burma, he has been able 
to function with total autonomy in his control of the UWSA Special Brigade 171.137 
The UWSA’s reputation as warriors dates back to ancient Burmese 
history. These ethnic nomads operated as headhunters and brigands, preying on the  
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numerous trading caravans moving between Burma and China. They even moved far 
enough out of the mountains to prey on the Indian caravans moving across the plains to 
trade with China also138.  
The UWSA honed their traditional reputation as guerilla fighters by 
operating as the “sword-arm” for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) from 1968 until 
1989. With the collapse of support to the CPB, the UWSA leadership took this 
opportunity to take over the Communists’ drug trafficking routes, and then expand them. 
Once the cease-fires were signed with the Tatmadaw, the UWSA became 
the proxy military force used against the Shan’s paramilitary Mong Tai Army (MTA). 
The use of the UWSA by the Tatmadaw resulted in the 1996 surrender of the Khun Sa, 
the MTA leader.139 The defeat of the MTA enabled the Wa, now aligned with the 
Myanmar regime, to take control of the Doi Lang Area in the Mong Yawn Valley.140  
According to Thailand, the UWSA are the most notorious drug-lords in 
Burma. It was the continually increasing flow of yaa baa methamphetamines from the 
UWSA which spurred Thailand’s 2003 “War on Drugs.”  Thailand’s Prime Minister 
Thaksin spoke of further confrontations with the UWSA, stating that Thai troops "would 
shoot to kill…Their [Wa] drugs have gradually killed our children, so we won’t spare 
them".141  
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Figure 3.   UWSA Soldiers traveling to war with Shan Forces 
 
The UWSA immediately took over the opium-producing region, and its 
infrastructure, previously controlled by the MTA. This considerably weakened the Shan 
opposition to the Tatmadaw in Northeastern Burma. The UWSA now operates with 
impunity in their territory, which has become an autonomous economic zone within the 
Shan State, as well as the Union of Burma, where they engage in narcotics refining and 
trafficking un-interrupted.142  
Today the UWSA operate numerous opium and yaa baa refineries in the 
Northeastern region of Burma. Their alliance with the Tatmadaw makes them dangerous 
to regional security, but more importantly, a vital tool of the Tatmadaw’s policies of 
continued ethnic cleansing.  
 
B. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
In understanding the control the Myanmar regime possesses in the country, an 
analysis of non-governmental organizations (NGO), international non-governmental 
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organizations (INGO), and other countries themselves, cannot be separated from a study 
of Burma itself. The United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and various humanitarian organizations’ relationships within Burma, with the 
regime, and the various ethnic minorities and paramilitaries must be examined as well. 
Also, individual countries such as the United States, China, Thailand, France, and India 
are just as important to the decision-making process faced by Tatmadaw in its domestic 
policies.  
 
1. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
 
ASEAN was severely critiqued by the international community for offering 
membership to Burma in 1997. The international community, particularly the Western 
democratic powers of the United States and the European Union, consider Burma to be 
ruled by an illegal and repressive regime, and were opposed to the inclusion of the 
country into the regional security organization. ASEAN, as a regional economic and 
security organization, saw this as an opportunity to bring the Myanmar regime, and 
therefore Burma, back into the fold of reform without isolation.  
 One of ASEAN’s defining doctrines is the policy of non-interference among their 
member nations. “In ASEAN’s view, political repression in Myanmar could not be used 
to justify the exclusion of Myanmar, since such a move would constitute interference in 
its internal affairs.143 This non-interference policy increased opposition from the Western 
powers since this would enable the Myanmar regime to perpetuate its rule by 
circumventing the economic sanctions placed on them by the US, UK, and other nation-
states.  
 ASEAN member-nations focused on a policy of “constructive engagement” with 
Burma. ASEAN, as an organization of nation-states, wanted to avoid any actions against 
the military regime which would “embarrass and isolate them.”144 Burma has been able 
to block reform in its domestic politics, falling back on ASEAN’s policies of non-
interference as a defense. According to the Tatmadaw’s foreign policy speakers: 
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“ASEAN would like to see Myanmar as an equal” and has consistently blocked any 
attempts to reform junta’s rule from outside of the region.145 
Constructive engagement continues to be an issue of contention between the 
Western powers and the nations of ASEAN. In 1991, during the Luxembourg 
agreements, the EU would come into conflict over their insistence that human rights and 
environmental concerns must be a part of every cooperative agreement between 
European countries and ASEAN nations.146  
ASEAN, of course, is worried about what it considers a greater threat than the 
aggravating of the West concerning human rights and the environment. The threat of 
Burma becoming a satellite to China worries ASEAN more than offending US-UK 
sensibilities.147 
Burma’s unpopularity among the ASEAN member nations is primarily caused by 
the actions the military regime against ethnic minorities. International protest has been 
made by numerous international humanitarian organizations concerning the level of 
abuses, and these atrocities not reflect on ASEAN’s image itself with Burma as a member 
state.  
Overall, ASEAN’s inclusion of Burma was more to force the United States to 
realize that SE Asian countries were going to make their own decisions concerning 
security and international relations.148 “Largely as a reaction against the perception that 
the West trying to bully and intrude in its internal affairs, ASEAN voted to admit 
Myanmar in 1997, as scheduled. The vote may have reinforced ASEAN’s independence, 
but it also severely damaged its international standing.”149 
In 2003, ASEAN urged Burma to release Daw  Suu Kyi, an unprecedented foray 
into the domestic politics of a member nation.150 Pressure from the international 
community concerning Burma, including statements from the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan, began to accelerate worries about the image of ASEAN.  
                                                 
145 Narine, p. 115. 
146 Acharya, p. 110. 
147 Selth, p. 17. 
148 Narine, p 114. 
149 Ibid, p 116. 
150 Vaclev, p. 36. 
47 
In 2006, when Burma was eligible to take the position of chairman of ASEAN, 
this international pressure culminated in Burma “opting out to focus on the national 
reconciliation and democratization.151 This occurred after considerable pressure from 
other member nations to decline the seat.152 The ASEAN inter-parliamentary Myanmar 
Caucus (AIPMC) was developed in order to deal with the issue of the Myanmar regime 
taking the chairmanship position, but has now developed into a regular part of the 
ASEAN foreign ministry infrastructure.  
While the alarming prospect of Burma taking the chairmanship has passed, the 
solution to ASEAN’s Burma problem is no clearer than before. As stated by the 
Singapore Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, “Burma cannot stay frozen in time forever. 
To stay frozen in time means they are building up problems for themselves and those 
problems will overflow into ASEAN”.153 ASEAN, through the AIPMC, has petitioned 
the UNSC to intervene, an unprecedented action for this regionally focused security 
organization. 
 
2. United Nations Security Council 
 
The United Nations Security Council was recently petitioned by the Honorable 
Vaclev Havel, the former President of the Czech Republic, and Bishop Desmond Tutu, 
Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town & Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (1984) on September 
20, 2005. The combined document produced petitions the UN Security Council to vote a 
resolution in accordance with its authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Article 
41.154  
 Since 1990, there have been seven UN Security Council votes on whether or not 
to intervene into the sovereignty of a UN member nation-state.155 There are six factors 
which have been used to determine the need for an engagement or intervention; these six 
factors are as follows: 
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Overthrow of Democratic Government 
Conflict among Factions 
Human Rights Violations 
Refugee Outflows 
Other (Drug Trafficking) 
Other (HIV/AIDS) 
These six factors have become the UN’s guideline for deciding on humanitarian 
interventions into sovereign nation-states. In the most extreme cases, four of these factors 
were present.156 In Burma, all six of these factors are present.  
 Still, the possibility of a UN Security Council vote is remote. A Security Council 
vote can be countered by a single member of the Security Council.157 Burma has an 
extremely close relationship with China, who holds a permanent seat on the Security 
Council. A China veto will prevent intervention into a country which has become an 
important satellite nation in the Chinese sphere of influence.  
 The United Nations has been trying to engage the Burmese military regime in any 
discourse at all regarding social, political, and economic change in the country.158 The 
Secretary-General’s office, UN General Assembly, UN commission on Human rights, 
Committee on Torture, Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the Economic Social 
Council have all tried to achieve some form of progress in Burma.159  
 It is important to note that the sudden shift of the Rangoon capital two hours north 
coincided with the increased pressure from the international community on the UNSC 
concerning intervention in Burma. The UNSC now also has a petition from the AIPMC 
and ASEAN as well, requesting intervention from the international community 
concerning the Myanmar regime.160 
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Certain nation-states require a more serious individual analysis of their 
relationships with Burma. More specifically, these countries’ relationships with Burma, 
its ethnic minorities, its ruling junta, the trafficking of its narcotics, and most importantly, 
how they relate to the two sides of its economy: Shadow and Overt, are a vital component 




Thailand is one of the most important countries to understand in the 
context of relationships with Burma. Thailand’s Western border is shared with Burma.161 
This border is mountainous, forested, and possesses very few roads. In ancient times, the 
empires and dynasties of Burma and Siam fought wars, yet also co-existed in numerous 
periods of peace. 162 These countries’ shared modern history has been shaped by a peace 
which has been progressively weakened by the Tatmadaw’s domestic problems spreading 
across the Thailand border on a regular basis.163  
Thailand has been consistent in its desire to maintain an economic 
relationship with Burma in spite of its human rights records and its growing illegal 
narcotics trade. Thailand was the first country to send a delegate to the illegal military 
junta following their suppression of the NLD after the 1990 election.164 The economic 
and security relationship which followed was mutually beneficial to the Tatmadaw and 
Thailand. The Tatmadaw was given latitude to cross their mutual border with Thailand in 
order to eliminate Karen and Mon guerillas.165 In return, the ban on the Thai logging 
companies operating in Burma was lifted. Also, Thailand Fisheries were given the 
freedom to operate in the Burmese portions of the Andaman Sea. This mutually 
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beneficial relationship would even empower Thailand to oppose Western pressure from 
the US and the EU to place economic sanctions on Burma.  
Due to the issue of illicit narcotics crossing the border from Burma into 
Thailand, the two countries’ relations have soured in recent years. In 2000, the head of 
the Thailand National Security Council identified drug trafficking as a serious threat to 
the country’s national security.166 The usage of the methamphetamine “yaa baa” has 
increased exponentially in the Thailand. There were one million yaa baa addicts in 
Thailand at the commencement of Thailand’s 2003 “War in Drugs.”167  
In 2003, Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin pledged to do “whatever 
possible to facilitate Burmese national reconciliation and a return to democracy.”168 At 
the same time though, Thaksin also pledged to direct a considerable amount of the 
country’s effort towards removing the yaa baa methamphetamine problem which has 
spread throughout Thailand. This action resulted in an outright four month conflict along 




China is the most significant country concerning the survivability of the 
military junta. China’s Yunnan province borders Burma.169 China is the largest investor 
of DI into Burma today, with the majority of the investments going directly into the 
UMEH, and therefore the Tatmadaw. This doe not mean China is oblivious to Burma’s 
lack of control within its own territorial borders. China though, much like Thailand, 
borders the Shan State Region, and is susceptible to the flow of opium and 
methamphetamines across its border.  
Ethnic minorities like the Wa exist in China as well as Burma, in the Shan 
State.170 600,000 of the one million Wa reside in the Yunnan province in China. Many 
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portions of the Wa population who live in Burma actually rely on the Chinese 
infrastructure as opposed to the Burmese ones.171 This means an increased need for 
Chinese support across the border, but from the perspective of China, who desires greater 
influence in Burma to counter India’s influence; this is not as bad thing. Instead, it is 
further influence China can guarantee with minimal effort on their part overtly.  
Burma has been characterized as a “pawn” of China. China’s FDI is the 
largest from of financial support available to the Tatmadaw’s shadow economy support 
of its growing military. Still, the Myanmar regime is comfortable with this situation due 
to increased isolation Rangoon feels concerning the “growing pressure from ASEAN 
nations and the international community.”172 The more ASEAN countries pressure the 
Myanmar regime to free Daw Sung Kyi, and re-enact constitutional legislation, the more 
the regime moves into a closer relationship with China.  
China’s own massive economic growth has caused an unprecedented thirst 
for oil in order to maintain their progress. The natural resources within Burma, the 
potential security gained by having an ally on its borders, and the stemming of the flow 
of drugs into their country are all important facets of the Chinese plans for Burma.  
China is also a country with strategic intentions for the future. With 
Burma as its ally, each with compatible military technologies, China is able to collect 
intelligence from the Andaman Sea, and maintain bases for the PLA Navy.173 Burma 
now has 23 intelligence collection companies in the Tatmadaw, compared with less than 
10 in 1988.174 These intelligence stations have gained a Chinese presence all the way 
down to the coastal Andaman Sea, giving China influence into both sides of Straits of 
Malacca.175  
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Burma also sees China as vital for their long-term strategic interests. 
Burma fears a multilateral UN intervention like the one which occurred against Indonesia 
and created the nation-state of East Timor.176 The Rangoon regime is seen as a ruling 
council which will pay any price to remain independent, and with increased isolation 
from the West, China is an important option for their survival.177  
The Chinese support of the Tatmadaw’s modernization creates a 
significant security buffer against India. According to a 2001 intelligence report on 
Burma’s military: 
The substantial growth in armor and artillery strength is linked to the 
delivery of Chinese equipment which began in mid-1990. As of early 
2003, there are 10 armored battalions (five with tanks and five with 
armored vehicles), compared with only two battalions in 1988, while the 
number of artillery units (including those armed with heavy mortars and 
recoilless guns) has risen to 43 battalions (in addition to 37 independent 
artillery companies attached to regional commands). Anti-aircraft strength 
has increased from one to seven artillery battalions in the same 10 year 
period.178  
 
With the absence of Western aid into the country, China is the leading donor to Burma, 
funding military and infrastructure projects.  
The comparable worldviews held by both the Burmese and Chinese 
regimes enable their relationship to survive. Both maintain a pragmatic view of the 





India must be considered in any analysis of Burma. Throughout the Cold 
War, India was a severe critic of the military regime and maintained a very hard line 
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against the military regime in Rangoon.180 India has re-assessed its view of Burma’s 
military regime as its relationship grew more  
India possesses a strong fear of China’s strategic orientation towards 
Burma, and its ports on the Andaman Sea. India, which has been the sole regional power 
in the Indian Ocean, now sees a Chinese presence extending down through Burma into 
their maritime territories.  
In recent meetings in Burma, India has removed the restoration of  Suu 
Kyi or the NLD to their diplomatic pressures for reform on the Rangoon regime.181 This 
has shifted India’s traditional pro-democracy stance toward the Myanmar Regime.182 
As stated by the APSS,  
India needs to ponder whether the bizarre spectacle of the world’s largest 
democracy courting one of world’s largest repressive regimes propped up 
by the world’s largest authoritarian state is in the long-term interests of its 
national security.183  
India, much like China, faces the difficult decision of trading off 
international credibility by increasing their focus on strategic interests. 
  
d.  FDI Countries 
 
Various countries need to be studied in order to see the varied levels of 
FDI and relationships exist between other nation-states in the international arena. While 
some countries, like the majority of the ASEAN nation-states, focus of preventing a 
greater Chinese influence into Burma, others are simply motivated by greed. Cheap 
labors, lack of human rights influence in their governments, and desire for economic 
parity with other countries are only some of their motivations.  
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Japan, much like other Asian countries, is worried about the direction the 
West’s isolation of Burma will take its military regime. In the opinion of the Japanese 
leadership, the situation is driving Rangoon directly into the welcoming arms of 
China.184  Japan has chosen to maintain its relationship with Burma, stating that “we 
have no plans to restrict Japanese business activities in Burma. Democracy is not the only 
standard in deciding our relationship with a country.”185 
France, despite being an EU country, has not joined the majority of the 
European Union in their multilateral sanctions being levied against Burma. Instead, 
France’s Standard Oil is one of the significant investors in the infrastructure of Burma. 
France is also a member of the UN Security Council, and therefore able to veto 
resolutions concerning any future interventions into Burma. With such invested interest 
in the resources within Burma, it’s no surprise that France already vetoed the European 
Union’s application of sanctions against the Myanmar regime.186 
The main reason for the constant block of changes in international policies 
by the French Government, and the European Union (EU) as well, towards Burma is the 
French oil giant TOTAL, which has been investing considerably into pipelines in Burma. 
French President Jacques Chirac was fully supportive of Burma’s addition to ASEAN in 
1997, hoping to gain the advantage of the countries’ liberalization of FDI.187  
The Yadana Gas Project, which is funded by TOTAL oil, is one of several 
large-scale projects reported for human rights abuses. Forced labor of minority refugees 
has enabled the project to move forward while lining the pockets of the SPDC’s 
members188. 
Malaysia, one of the founding members of ASEAN, has many companies 
which invest in Burma today. Petronas, the national oil company of Malaysia, has 
invested heavily in natural gas pipelines in Burma. As one of the leading countries  
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arguing for non-interference, Malaysia has been reaping the benefits of conducting 
business with Burma while turning a blind eye to the military junta’s human rights 
violations.  
Before Burma had opened itself to FDI, Malaysia was extremely critical of 
Rangoon’s suppression of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority in the country189. Although 
Malaysia has maintained a strong economic relationship with the Myanmar regime, many 
Malaysian foreign ministers have established very vocal criticisms of the government 
through their positions in AIPMC.190 
 
4. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) 
 
The importance of NGOs for the situation in Burma cannot be discounted. 
Numerous respected NGOs have produced important reports concerning the human rights 
atrocities perpetrated by the illegal Myanmar regime. Many of these reports have been 
based on information collected from refugees crossing into Thailand, Bangladesh, Laos, 
and India.191  
Amnesty International has been continually documenting the histories of the 
refugees fleeing the Tatmadaw military’s rule in Burma, conducting interviews to 
increase the case against the regime for its human rights atrocities.192 As the international 
watch-dog organization for human rights abuses, Amnesty International has focused a 
great deal of effort on investigating human rights atrocities in Burma.   
The United Nations has various reporting agencies tracking the situation in 
Burma. The UNODC will specifically be analyzed in the next few chapters, but they are 
far from the only UN agency with specific interests in Burma.  
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) contributes support due to the 
status of Burma as a LDC, which also places them on the agency support of the United 
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Nations High Representative of Least Developed Countries (UNHRLDP).193 A list of 
further international organizations which give aid, education, or support to Burma in 
some manner or another are: 
UNICEF – United Children’s Fund 
UNAIDS – United Nations AIDS/HIV program  
UNHCR - United Nations Refugee Agency 
WHO – World Health Organization 
WFP – World Food Program 
FAO – UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
 
The multilateral sanctions led by the US and UK has influenced several important 
international financial institutions in their dealings with the Myanmar regime. The IMF, 
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank have all suspended any financial 
assistance to Burma. This suspension began immediately following the military’s 1988 
massacres of student democratic protestors.194  
The maintenance of humanitarian good-will in Burma is important to note, 
because, as much as the lack of coordinated efforts between US policies, these 
organizations’ efforts have helped maintain the illegal Myanmar regime’s grip on power 




The complexity of enacting successful counter-narcotics policies in Burma are 
exacerbated by the numerous international and national actors which must be considered 
prior to policy implementation. With an understanding of how complex these 
relationships are, a further understanding of the narcotics trade in Burma itself can be 
further analyzed.  
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IV. PATTERNS OF ILLICT NARCOTICS PRODUCTION AND 
TRANSPORTATION 
 The specific parameters of the cultivation, production, and transportation of 
opium and methamphetamines from Northeastern Burma are vital to the understanding of 
how the Myanmar regime manipulates the US counter-narcotic policies. The Golden 
Triangle region, in which the Shan State Region of Burma resides, has a specific climate, 
which establishes specific parameters which the US attempts to remove through a 
triumvirate of policies: Interdiction, eradication, and education. 
 
A. THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE 
 
The Golden Triangle is a mountainous region in mainland Southeast Asia. It is a 
largely impassable territory of 350,000 square kilometers that includes four separate 
countries: Burma, Laos, Thailand, and China. The Golden Triangle has been Southeast 
Asia’s most important illicit drug producing region, and one of the world’s largest drug 
producing regions since the 1950s.  
The Golden Triangle is a confluence for the Mae Sai and Mekong Rivers, making 
it an ideal area for opium farming and heroin production. The climate, soil, elevation, and 
humidity combines to create an ideal location for the cultivation of Papaver 
somniferum195, the sole poppy which produces opium. Because of the confluence of these 
rivers, it is also an ideal location for transporting the drugs to other locations for 
trafficking.   
The development of opium in this region still has a relatively recent history, only 
developing with the Southern movement of Chinese opium farmers from the Yunnan 
province in the 18th century.196  
When the British Empire controlled Burma, they encouraged an increase in the 
cultivation of heroin opium in order to facilitate further trade with China. Prior to this, 
opium production was centered in India, and the British East India Company funneled the 
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opium into Southeast Asian and Chinese clients. The ready-made market created by the 
suppression of the drug trade within China created an ideal product to gain inroads into 
China.197 
Opium use had already developed inside of China, in the Yunnan Province. The 
Qing repeatedly attempted to remove the trade from the country, and their assaults on 
opium storehouses had resulted in significant reduction, but only resulted in an 
emboldening of the British in their usage of the illicit opium trafficking to force their 
influence upon the Chinese Emperors.  
At its peak in the mid 1880's, opium was one of the most valuable commodities 
moving in international trade. Each year, export opium leaving Calcutta and Bombay 
averaged over 90,000 chests containing more than 5,400 metric tons. This staggering 
amount would meet the annual needs of between 13 and 14 million opium consumers in 
China and Southeast Asia who smoked opium on a daily basis-and many more if less 
intense use were assumed. Each year, opium revenues poured 93.5 million rupees (9.4 
million pounds sterling) into Government of India coffers-approximately 16% of total 
official revenues.198  
The British, in an attempt to cultivate the Shan, and the other cultures along the 
Silk Road, extended the practice of opium growing in order to reduce the risk of banditry 
to caravans, along with reducing transportation costs. This founded the modern opium 




The cultivation and production of the opium poppy must be understood in order to 
see the cultural effect it has upon a region. More importantly, the effect the cultivation 
has upon the economy which grows the opium must be studied as well. This will 
highlight the need of the Tatmadaw to preserve the drug trade among certain minority 
armies in order to gain the economic benefits of the illegal trade. 
 
                                                 




Figure 4.   Opium Poppies growing in Burma in the Shan State Region 
 
Currently, Burma is the world’s second largest producer of opium.199  Until the 
re-insurgence of opium trade in Afghanistan which coincided with the fall of Taliban to 
US-led Coalition forces in the close of 2001, Burma was the leading producer of opium 
in the world. Recent estimates have placed 80-90 percent of the heroin production in 
Burma to be in the Shan State Region, the Northeastern part of the country which falls 
within the Golden Triangle.200 
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Figure 5.   Major Opium Poppy Growing Provinces in Southeast Asia 
 
The farming of opium is usually done in a “slash and burn” style, where seasonal 
opium growth marks a turnover of farms.201 The highlands of the Shan State, where 
elevations of 700 to 2000 meters combine with 17 to 24 degree Celsius climates, are ideal 
for the growth of the poppy. Combining with sunflowers, Chinese bean, mustard, 
fababean, onions, and other annual crops, soil fertility as well as camouflage is 
achieved.202 
Even during the dry season, the lands in which opium poppies are grown require 
extensive work. Fertilizer additions have recently been made to the opium poppy growth 
in the Shan State Region, but most areas are still operating without fertilizer chemicals. 
Also, traditional pre-motor technology is still practiced in most of the Golden 
Triangle.203 This presents many opportunities for the drug producers in the region to 
utilize forced labor collected from the ongoing conflict between the Shan and Wa.  
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The six months in which the opium poppy is grown requires a lot of care. The 
first two months growth requires the poppies to be constantly protected. Trampling by 
animals, insects, and destruction by opposing drug armies require the poppy farms to be 
constantly protected.204  
With the lack of vehicle, the transport of the transferred opium gum is usually 
done by mule and horse caravans over rugged and nearly impassable mountains to remote 
refineries. There, the opium is processed from poppy to morphine gum paste, and then 
into heroin. 
The production of heroin from opium is a difficult process and requires a 
significant amount of skill: 
 
 
Figure 6.   Opium to Morphine to Heroin Production Progression 
 
The following is a step-by-step description of morphine extraction in a typical Mainland 
Southeast Asian laboratory:  
An empty 55-gallon oil drum is placed on bricks about a foot above the ground 
and a fire is built under the drum. Thirty gallons of water are added to the drum 
and brought to a boil. Ten to 15 kilograms of raw opium are added to the boiling 
water. 
With stirring, the raw opium eventually dissolves in the boiling water, while soil, 
leaves, twigs, and other non-soluble materials float in the solution. Most of these 
materials are scooped out of the clear, dark brown “liquid opium” solution. 
Slaked lime (calcium hydroxide) or, more often, a readily available chemical 
fertilizer with a high content of lime, is added to the solution. Lime will convert 
water- insoluble morphine alkaloid into water-soluble calcium morphenate. 
(Other opium alkaloids do not react with lime to form water-soluble calcium salts, 
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as does morphine.) Codeine is an opium alkaloid that is slightly water-soluble and 
some codeine will be carried over with the calcium morphenate in the liquid. 
Otherwise, for the most part, the other alkaloids will become a part of the 
“sludge.” 
As the solution cools, the morphine solution is scooped from the drum and poured 
through a filter. Cloth rice sacks are often used as filters and can then be squeezed 
in a press to remove most of the solution from the wet sacks. Liquid saponated 
cresol (“lysol”) is commonly added to the solution to facilitate filtering. The 
morphine-rich solution is then poured into large cooking pots and reheated but, 
this time, not boiled. 
Ammonium chloride (a powder) is added to the heated calcium morphenate 
solution to adjust the alkalinity to a pH of 8 to 9, and the solution is then allowed 
to cool. Within 1 or 2 hours, morphine base precipitates (“crashes”) out of the 
solution and settles to the bottom of the cooking pot. 
The solution is then poured off through cloth filters. Any solid morphine base 
chunks in the solution will remain on the cloth. The morphine base is removed 
from both the cooking pot and from the filter cloths, wrapped and squeezed in 
cloth, and then dried in the sun. When dry, the crude morphine base is a coffee-
colored coarse powder. This form of morphine is commonly known by the 
Chinese term pi-tzu in Mainland Southeast Asia.  
If morphine base is to be stored or transported to another location, it may be 
pressed into blocks. Crude morphine base is generally 50 percent to 70 percent 
morphine, and is an intermediate product in the heroin process. (This morphine 
base is generally not used by addicts.) 
This crude morphine base may be further purified (and changed to morphine 
hydrochloride) by dissolution in hot water and hydrochloric acid, then adding 
activated charcoal, reheating, and filtering. The solution is filtered several times 
before being allowed to cool. As the solution cools, morphine hydrochloride 
precipitates out of the solution and settles to the bottom. The precipitate is trapped 
(or “captured”) by filtration.  
If the morphine hydrochloride is to be stored or transported to another location, it 
may be pressed into bricks. Morphine hydrochloride (often tainted with codeine 
hydrochloride) is usually pressed into brick-sized blocks in a press and wrapped 
in paper or cloth. The most common block size is 2 inches by 4 inches by 5 
inches, and weighs about 3 pounds (1.3 kilograms). It takes a full day to extract 
morphine from opium.205  
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Because of the specific skills required in changing the opium poppies into the 
morphine base, heroin “cooks” or chemists are highly in-demand personnel who make 
much more money than the opium farmers which cultivate the poppy.206 This is also 
because the heroin production process requires a large amount of volatile chemicals, 
which are prone to explosions during the production process.  
One of the key areas DEA agents have been focusing on is the production areas of 
heroin.207 Precursor chemicals are vital to the production of some drugs; particularly 
heroin.208 The regulation of these chemicals is entirely dependent on the enforcement and 
tracking abilities of the country’s law enforcement organizations. The ability to track the 
majority of these chemicals would seem to be within the control of the Tatmadaw, since 
the regime controls all of the legal economy in Burma. In truth, there has been a long 
history of approval from the Rangoon regime in the trafficking of drugs. This approval 
has grown in recent years with the high profit production of methamphetamines growing 




The Golden Triangle is not only abundant in opium poppies used in heroin 
production, but also in Ephedra Vulgairs. The Ephedra Vulgaris is a shrub-like plant, 
typically found growing wild in Northern China, which contains ephedrine, the main 
precursor for methamphetamines. These local varieties of ephedra are notoriously more 
potent than those found in other areas around the world.209  
Methamphetamines are stimulants, but due to the added sulfates from the Ephedra 
Vulgaris plant, they have stronger primary and secondary side-effects than other 
amphetamines. The hypo-chloride methamphetamines produced from the Golden 
Triangle region cause severe paranoia, schizophrenia, and extreme aggressiveness. This  
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strength is the reason for the growing number of paranoid schizophrenia and powerful 
mental health damage caused by prolonged usage, giving the local methamphetamine its 
name: yaa baa, or “crazy medicine.”210 
In recent years, methamphetamine production and shipment have grown 
significantly in Burma, especially in the Northeastern portion of the country. In the early 
nineties, many of the minority drug-lords in Northeastern Burma expanded their 
production and transportation into amphetamine-type substances (ATS).211  
Much like the opium poppy, the ephedra plant is indigenous to the Golden 
Triangle region. The production of methamphetamines is a much simpler process than the 
production of heroin from the opium poppy. Furthermore, the process of ATS production 
can be completed using only over-the-counter chemicals and materials. “The main 
ingredients, which include salt, household cleaning products, distilled cold medicines and 
lithium from camera batteries, can be bought legally and the drug easily knocked out at 
home with a couple of casserole dishes and a hob (aquarium filtration device).212 This 
reduces the need for a class of skilled “heroin” cooks to manage the refineries.  
Since methamphetamine labs are inexpensive to set up and much easier to hide 
than heroin labs, the cost for maintenance and production is reduced to the drug lords. 
Also, since the farming and cultivation of the ephedra plant is not as susceptible to 
climate shifts like the opium poppy, it can be produced year-round. 
Over 700 million yaa baa pills are produced annually and shipped into 
Thailand.213 The cost for production is miniscule, and a mere thirty-six thousand pills can 
re-coup an entire years’ investment. The current production cost of a single yaa baa pill in 
Burma today is only $.03. The Thailand border sale cost of the same pill is $.67, or 25 
Baht.214 Meanwhile, the same pill can be sold in Bangkok for the price of $3.24, or 125 
Baht. This is the equivalent of a return 108 times the size of the investment by shipping 
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the drugs to Bangkok. Also, since yaa baa is odorless, and cannot be smelled by drug 
sniffing dogs, it is much easier to transport than heroin.215 
Because of the simplicity of the production process, numerous yaa baa refineries 
have been expanding along the Thailand-Burma border since 1994 in order to reduce the 
dangers to the transportation section of narcotics trafficking.   
 
 
Figure 7.   Location of Heroin and Methamphetamine Refineries in March 2003 
 
The considerable increases in methamphetamine production in Burma, and particularly 
the Shan State Region, has been a substantial destabilizing effect on the Southeast Asian 
mainland countries. This is mainly due to the ease which it can be transported to other 
countries. 
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 B. ILLICT NARCOTIC TRANSPORTATION 
 
The history of narcotics transportation in Burma continued as an unregulated form 
of economic support through the Japanese occupation, World War II, and the beginning 
of the Union of Burma. With the solidifying of the coup government in 1962, the 
Myanmar regime focused on the regulation of the opium trade, attempting to gain their 
own financial rewards from its production. 
From 1963 to 1973, the General Ne Win military regime actually gave “travel 
permits,” known as movement orders, which were issued to the local drug warlords for 
their legal transport of opium.216 The military also used the compliant opium-producing 
paramilitaries in the region as “home guards” to compensate for their own inability to 
control the periphery regions.  
Various Shan military forces used these legal drug trafficking permits to their own 
advantage and re-sold arms to the insurgent forces fighting the Tamadaw, and the 
movement orders were revoked in February 1973. These home guard forces simply 
returned to the mountains to join their insurgent brothers in the fight against the Myanmar 
regime, moving the regulatory control of the opium trade fully out of Burmese hands.217  
The movement of drugs from Southeast Asia has been tracked by US government 
organizations for some time. According to a 1998 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
publication, Southern China and Thailand are the ideal paths for the movement of illicit 
narcotics from Burma. According to the report: 
China serves as a key destination and transshipment point for Burmese- 
produced heroin, and has likely equaled, if not surpassed Thailand as the 
main transit corridor for heroin exported from Burma. Opiates move 
overland from Burma, through southern China to Hong Kong, Macau, and 
other regional commercial air and maritime centers for forwarding to 
Australia, Taiwan, Europe, and North America via maritime and air 
means.218 
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Thailand is just as popular of a route for Burmese traffickers of narcotics. Mule 
trains like the one in the following photo are used to move the drugs across the Thai-
Burma border to waiting vehicles which take the drugs down to Bangkok.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Mule Train carrying refined Heroin across the Thai-Burmese Border 
 
The movement of illegal narcotics is easily shifted from country to country when 
local law enforcement attempts to interdict the trade. The Mekong River is poorly 
policed, enabling drug-lords to shift their trafficking routes from country to country.219 
This enabled any country bordering the Mekong to be used to escape the interdiction 
efforts from another country by simply slipping into different jurisdictional territories.  
Once the drugs arrive in Bangkok, they are transferred to aircraft or maritime 
vessels which can take the drugs on to their next distribution points.220 The following 
map gives a clear view of the movements of heroin once they depart from ports in 
countries neighboring Burma. 
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Figure 9.   Regional Southeast Asian Drug Routes 
 
The CIA lists these other important factors concerning the shipment of illicit 
heroin from Burma: 
Although heroin trafficking through Thailand has dropped in recent years due to 
tighter border security, the country remains a principal transit corridor and market 
for Burmese heroin and opium. Heroin moves overland through northern Thailand 
to Bangkok and southern Thailand for export by air and maritime conveyances.  
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Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia have emerged as secondary transit zones and 
markets for Burmese heroin and opium. While most Lao-produced heroin appears 
to be consumed domestically, Burmese heroin flows overland through Laos to 
China and Vietnam for local use and transshipment overseas.  
 
Southeast Asian heroin and opium are smuggled to Australia from the Golden 
Triangle and China by commercial and noncommercial maritime means, as well 
as by couriers on scheduled flights.  
 
Although most illicit heroin consumed in India originates in Afghanistan or 
Pakistan, a small percentage of Burmese heroin and opium moves westward by 
vehicle, river, and foot to India and Bangladesh, primarily for domestic use.  
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have emerged as both a market and transit 
routes for heroin destined for Europe, Australia, and the United States. Nigerian 
and other African trafficking groups based in Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and 
Singapore use couriers to smuggle 1- to 2-kilogram quantities on scheduled 
flights to Europe and North America.  
 
While not major consumers of heroin, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea’s 
advanced transportation infrastructure and large-scale trade volume all serve as 
potential transit routes for Southeast Asian heroin destined for North America and 
Europe.  
 
Most Southeast Asian heroin is imported into North America and Western Europe 
in maritime containers, primarily via major shipping centers. Smaller amounts are 
brought to consuming nations by individual couriers on commercial flights.221 
 
The advent of methamphetamines has only increased the usage of these routes for 
shipment and distribution to global markets. The following image depicts the continued 
flow of heroin and illicit substances around the world.  
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Figure 10.   Global Illicit Narcotics Trafficking Paths  
 
 
C. OPIUM BAN 
  
In order to reduce the flow of opium from the Burma, the UN proposed a ban on 
opium. Using the US model of counter-narcotics, the UNODC, as well as other 
humanitarian agencies, are attempting to establish alternative options for economic 
development, enabling the ethnic minorities in Northeastern Burma to shift away from 
opium as a sole source of production, thereby reducing the levels of illicit narcotics being 
trafficked to other countries. In order to achieve this, pressure was levied on the 
Myanmar regime through its signatory position concerning UN conventions of counter-
narcotics.  
Burma is a signatory country of the 1988 United Nations convention on illicit 
drug reduction.222 The regime’s lack of action concerning a reduction in the drug trade 
has been a serious issue of diplomatic pressure for the Myanmar regime. This pressure 
has come from Thailand, other member nations in ASEAN, China, India, and the United 
Nations.  
In response to considerable international pressure, the military junta in Burma 
agreed in 1999 to ban opium by the year 2014.223 The Rangoon military regime focused 
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the beginning of the opium ban to start in the Special regions 2 and 4 in the Eastern Shan 
State.224 The UNODC contributed by starting alternative development programs in the 
same regions.225 In order to work within the framework of the Myanmar Regime’s anti-
drug endeavors, the UWSA, under the same international pressure, proclaimed a total 
opium ban in their region of the Shan State by 2007.  
On the surface, the opium bad seems to be exactly what the international 
community wants. According to UNODC figures, there has been a significant reduction 
in the number of opium produced in Burma. In their 2005 Opium Survey, the UNODC 
stated another significant annual reduction in the hectares of opium being produced in 
Burma.226 Since 2000, two-thirds of the opium fields in Northeastern Burma have 
disappeared. An eighty percent reduction occurred in 2005 alone, with the number of 
hectares falling from 163,000 totals down to 32,800 hectares.  
According to INCSR figures published in 2004, the metric tons of opium 
produced in Burma were reduced from 2,560 tons to 484 tons n 2003.227 The number of 
opium cultivated in Burma, according to INCSR figures, also reduced from 163,100 
hectares down to 47,130 tons in 2003.228 Due to the minimal difference between the 
numbers, it is easy to state that the UNODC and the INCSR figures come form the same 
sources on the opium reduction in Burma.229  
It is along these successes upon which the US and UN have been continuing their 
counter-narcotic policies in Burma. With further examination though, the parameters 
upon which the US, and therefore the UN, have based these policies, have created a 
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V. US & INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-NARCOTIC POLICIES 
 The US and UN counter-narcotic efforts in Burma are based on policies enacted 
in other countries.230 Their success have been based on certain factors which both the US 
and international agencies do not possess in Burma. They include: 
• Support from the Nation-State federal government 
• On the ground verification of policy success 
• Some level of a functioning infrastructure to enact local-level policy 
implementations 
This of course, does not presume that the usual side effects of an illicit narcotics trade do 
not exist in theses countries, to include corruption, falsifying of reports to the verifying 
authorities, and competing political interests. This argument simply emphasizes that the 
ability to verify the successes achieved in other countries is wholly impossible in Burma 
under the Myanmar regime. 
 
A. US COUNTER-COUNTER NARCOTIC POLICIES 
  
1. US Policy Survey 
  
 The US attempts to counter the illegal flow of narcotics with bilateral 
relationships, focusing around military and economic aid.231 Various bilateral counter-
narcotic agreements have been made with Southeast Asian countries to support the 
international conventions signed in the United Nations’ Conventions of the cultivation 
and trafficking of illegal narcotics When a bilateral effort cannot be established, the US 
works in a regional multilateral approach.232 In Burma’s case, the US works with the 
UNODC almost directly, as efforts to establish bilateral links have either been rebuffed or 
met with a minimalist token effort on the past of the Myanmar regime.233 
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 US counter-narcotic policies have been meshed with Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) efforts since the events of September 11th. 234 According to the 2005 INCSR, 
“on a world scale…..illegal drug revenues have become so great that it is likely that most 
large international criminal enterprises rely on drug money to some extent to finance their 
operations.”235 This drug production has become “inextricably linked to transnational 
organized crime and many terrorist organizations.”236  Coordinated International Law 
Enforcement Efforts have linked closely with the GWOT and have re-defined their 
initiatives.  
 According to the International Law Enforcement (INL) their programs are: 
Designed to advance international cooperation in order to reduce the 
foreign production and trafficking of illicit cocoa, opium poppy, 
marijuana, and other illegal drugs. INL commodity and technical 
assistance programs improve foreign government institutional capabilities 
to implement their own comprehensive national drug control plans that 
will reduce the trafficking in illicit drugs and money laundering activities. 
Training and assistance also supports prevention and treatment programs 
designed to increase public awareness of the drug threat to strengthen the 
international coalition against drug trafficking. An INL interregional 
aviation program supports drug-crop eradication, surveillance, and 
counter-drug enforcement operations.237 
This synchronized effort is where the US efforts towards Burma’s cultivation and 
trafficking of illicit narcotics are coordinated. 
 On March 24, 2005, the United States listed Burma as the largest producer and 
trafficker of methamphetamine pills in Southeast Asia.238 The US initiated various 
regional education, eradication, and interdiction efforts in order to counter the flow of 
these drugs from Burma into the international markets. Significant amounts of US money 
are spent to aid our allies in their regional wars on drugs through these programs.239 Wa 
leaders like Wei Hsueh-kang are wanted by the US government for trafficking both 
heroin and ATS pills. The US State Department has offered $2 million to anyone who 
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hands him over to American officials.240 Still, despite an ever-growing budget, numerous 
assets, and the coordinated effort of the US and allied forces, the drug problem continues 
to grow. A study of the obstacles to US counter-narcotic efforts will highlight the 
difficulties of establishing a unified counter-narcotics policy. 
 
2. Obstacles to the Development of a Unified and Coordinated Counter-
narcotics Policy 
 
 The full scale of the international narcotics problem must be understood before 
any critique of the US counter-narcotics efforts can be made. The illicit narcotics market 
in the US provides the opportunity for drug dealers, who often have little opportunity for 
growth in their native countries, to earn up to a thirty-fold profit for every gram of the 
drug which reaches the United States.241  
 There are significant domestic and international policy obstacles to the 
development of an effective coordinated counter-narcotics policy. Domestic politics 
surround the limited budget available to the counter-narcotics efforts. The number of 
civilian, military, health, and educational organizations required to coordinate the 
multitude of necessary drug programs necessitates considerable synchronization. The 
Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) fulfills this role by harmonizing the 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).242 Within this 
framework, there are numerous agencies competing for mission-required funding to 
accomplish their missions on the domestic and international fronts of the “War on 
Drugs.” 
 Focusing larger funding to Southeast Asia is limited by the distance between the 
continental United States and the destabilizing effects of narcotics trafficking there. The 
Andean region in South America contributes too much more of the illegal narcotics flow 
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into the country.243 This results in a greater focus of the monetary funding and policy 
coordination to this region. Although this does not mean the US has not placed a 
significant amount of effort into SE Asia, it has simply fixed the “lion’s share” of it’s 
efforts into counter-narcotic efforts closer to the mainland United States. 
 
3. Individual, Coordinated, and Multilateral US Counter-Narcotic 
Polices  
 
 International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) are being built by the US in 
order to “support emerging democracies, help protect US interests through international 
cooperation, and to promote social, political, and economic stability by combating 
crime244. They are built to foster international law enforcement relationships by 
addressing common problems associated with criminal activities. 
 The ILEA Bangkok opened in March 1999.245 Subject matter experts from Japan, 
the US, Thailand, the Netherlands, Australia, Hong Kong, and the Philippines provide 
instruction. Attendance is open to ASEAN member-countries, the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), and the Hong Kong/Macau Special Counter-narcotic agencies. 550 students 
are trained annually in the Bangkok ILEA.246  
 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is another key player in the 
execution of US international drug strategies. Since the majority of the narcotics 
trafficked in the US come from outside the country, the DEA has a very international 
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agreements, intelligence gathering, and coordination of training programs like the ILEAs. 
These various efforts culminate in the assistance and development of host country drug 
law enforcement.247  
 The Royal Thai Army (RTA) now operates an Interagency Intelligence Fusion 
Center (IIFC) in Chang Mai, the second largest city in Thailand. Chang Mai is close to 
the Golden Triangle as well as the Burmese border, and is an ideal location to track the 
activities of drug producers in the Shan State Region.248 
 Based on intelligence collected at the IIFC in December 2002, a January 13, 2003 
attempted interdiction of a UWSA caravan into Thailand seized 1 million 
methamphetamine yaa baa pills which were left behind by the escaping drug 
transporters.249  
 Significant seizures were made throughout 2003 by the joint efforts of the DEA, 
the RTA, and the Thailand Special Investigations Bureau. Much of what was confiscated 
involved yaa baa, as well as heroin. A number of the seizures included UWSA forces.250   
 The interdiction portion of the US counter-narcotic efforts is being praised for a 
reduction in flow of yaa baa and heroin from Northeastern Burma. Thailand and DEA 
joint intelligence agencies believe the yaa baa methamphetamine pills are building up in 
warehouses in the Shan State Region because of the UWSA’s inability to transport past 
the new joint efforts created by the international “war on drugs”.251 Thailand intelligence 
officials point to the new “frustration” of the Burmese drug lords, resulting from their 
counter-narcotic efforts. Still, there is a strong belief that alternate routes have been 
established.  
 Yaa Baa addiction in Thailand is still growing, not shrinking. In other mainland 
Southeast Asian nations252, yaa baa usage is also on the rise.253 New routes using the  
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Mekong River to transport narcotics into Cambodia are the most recently suspected 
means of trafficking yaa baa; heroin has been tracked moving up into Laos from the same 
river.  
 In June 2001, Burma was placed on the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) list 
of non-cooperating countries due to its poor quality anti-money laundering laws.254 There 
has been new legislation passed in Burma to comply with the FATF’s requests, and a new 
Financial Investigation Force has been established for the DEA in Rangoon to aid the 
Burmese.  
 Interdiction is the most difficult portion of the counter-narcotic effort. Opium can 
be grown in many different climates and conditions.255 This makes it extremely difficult 
to track the cultivation and production of the drug.  
 The US has defined a “five-point user chain” in an attempt to halt the flow of 
narcotics to the US without relying solely on interdiction256. The five point user chain 
entails:  
1) The growers cultivating the drug  
2) The processor of the drug  
3) The transit/transporter of the drug  
4) The Wholesalers / Retailers of the drug and  
5) The drug user in the US.257 
 
According to US international counter-narcotic theorists, “crop control is the most 
cost-effective form of cutting the supply of drugs.”258 The INCSR acknowledges that this 
entails significant economic and political ramifications for the country in which the 
supply removal occurs. Massive chemical eradication of crops, even illegal ones, is 
illegal itself in many countries. Also, this eradication attacks the poorest sectors of the  
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population, who usually have nothing else besides the drug production to survive.259 The 
US states in the INCSR that the focus must entail a long-term result as well as an 
immediate impact.  
 The success of the combined eradication, education, and interdiction efforts in 
Peru and Bolivia, when they are combined with an alternative development program have 
resulted in attempt to re-apply these policies in Burma. The ethnic distribution within the 
county makes the applications of these strategies much more difficult.  
 In more specific dealings with drug trafficking in Burma, the US has also 
designated certain ethnic paramilitaries as listed Foreign Narcotics Kingpins.260 This 
designation enables more substantial funding and effort to be placed on the apprehension 
of these individuals. The UWSA leadership was added to this list by US President 
George W. Bush on June 2, 2002, making it illegal for any US government officials, or 
US businesses, to deal with the UWSA.261  
 In 2005, the INCSR was submitted again in March 2006 with acknowledgement 
of Burma’s failure to implement effective preventative measures and its lack of 
compliance with counter-narcotics enforcement” as well as the regime’s need to “address 
the increased threat of synthetic drugs.”262 The US states in the 2005 INCSR that due to 
the sanctions on direct assistance to the Myanmar regime require the “cooperation of 
regional allies in counter-narcotic efforts – mainly Thailand and China.”263 The focus on 
alternative development and infrastructure programs being implemented in insurgent 
areas are the necessary complements to interdiction.264  
 The INCSR proclaims the following necessary tools the Burmese government 
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• Crop Eradication 
• Counter-narcotic actions 
• Effective Law Enforcement 
• Alternative development 
• Support for former poppy developers 
 
 Still, the 2005 INCSR makes references to the continued reduction in opium 
growth and cultivation in the border regions in the Shan State Region.265 The report also 
focuses on the lack of opium production outside of the Shan region.266 The INCSR 
therefore, by a simple statement, focuses all of the counter-narcotic efforts in Burma to be 
in the Shan State Regions. Furthermore, by stating the lack of opium production in the 
regional lowlands where the Tatmadaw maintains near total control, as non-complicit in 
the drug trade. All US methods will develop out of this strategic focus.  
 
4. United States Drug Eradication Methods 
 
 The United States attempts to counter the traffic of illegal narcotics by the 
following methods: 
1. Attack Traffic Organizations 
2. Institutional Reform 
3. Extradition 
4. Controlling Drug Processing Chemicals 
5. Controlling Supply 
6. Interdiction in the Transit Zone 
7. Demand Reduction 
The US has not turned a blind eye to the dangers of drug trafficking, and has been 
extremely supportive of interdicting and eliminating the drugs on many levels. In January 
2005, eight members of the UWSA leadership were indicted in US federal court on 
charges of drug trafficking. Even the leading UWSA tribal drug lord, Wei Hsueh Kang, 
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has been indicted, with a two million dollar bounty placed on his head by the US 
government. Almost one year later, none of these members have been captured, or 
brought to trial in the United States.267  
 And yet Burma is not mentioned once during the budgetary recommendations for 
FY 2006.268 Southeast Asia as a whole is referred to as a region where opium cultivation 
is in a “sharp decline” and unable to even meet the “regional demand” for the product.269 
The regional efforts are considered to be an “advance,” only to be off-set by the 
increasing cultivation in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime.270 
 The US policies are not without considerable international support. The UNODC 
works closely in concert with the US concerning counter-narcotic policies around the 
world. Due to the extensive involvement in the removal of illicit drugs from Burma, no 
analysis of counter-narcotics in the region would be complete without an understanding 
of the UN policies.   
 
B. UNODC COUNTER-NARCOTIC POLICIES 
 
 The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime is the UN organization dedicated 
to the reduction of international drug trafficking, as well as the criminal effects of 
narcotic cultivation, refining, trafficking, and usage. The US ONDCP directly funds and 
supports the UNODC efforts. Therefore, US efforts are strongly tied into the international 
UN efforts.  
  There are many international treaties which have been signed by UN member 
nations concerning the eradication of illicit narcotic trafficking, including Burma. Burma 
has signed numerous treaties concerning the elimination of illegal narcotics. The 1961 
UN Single Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 
1988 UN Drug Convention, as well as the UNODC’s 1995 sub-regional action plan for 
counter-narcotics were all signed by the Myanmar regime.271 
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 Regional efforts have been the focus of the UNODC, with territory-oriented 
programs to remove the need for narcotics production at the core of many of the 
international organizations programs. In the 2005 Myanmar opium survey, the results 
found jointly by the UNODC and the Myanmar regime mirror the reductions found by 
the US counter-narcotic organizations. In other words, all counter-narcotics organizations 
are considering the opium bans in the Shan State Region to be successful. There was a 
twenty-six percent reduction in opium poppy cultivation in Burma with a twenty-five 
percent reduction in the Shan State occurred in 2005.272  Furthermore, large reductions 
occurred in the number of families cultivating opium poppies.273  
 The UNODC WADP was originally created to be a $12.1 million five-year 
plan.274 Its goal was the development of alternative crops to replace the opium-reliance in 
the Shan State Region territory controlled by the UWSA. The budget was recently 
increased to $16.8 million and extended to 2007.275 
 The United Nations sponsored the Greater Mekong  Sub-region Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) was the regional Southeast Asian attempt by the UNODC to 
attack the flow of illegal narcotics through cooperative efforts of the local countries.276 
The MOU included the original member nations of Burma (Myanmar Regime), China, 
Laos, and Thailand. The group became the MOU-6 when Vietnam and Cambodia joined 
the UNODC-founded group.277 
 The collective UN multilateral polices focus along the same goals as the US 
bilateral policies. The most important factor to note is the US financial and operational 
support of these triumvirate policies enacted by the UN. This places the UN’s direction 
almost solely in the pocketbook of the US counter-narcotic efforts. This is not a totally 
adverse situation, since it enables the US to coordinate directly with countries at the 
bilateral level while working through multilateral diplomatic efforts with the UN General 
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Assembly and Security Council. What it does do, is make both agencies susceptible to the 
same levels of manipulation which will be addressed later.  
  
C. US DEMOCRATIZATION POLICIES / ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
AGAINST THE MYAMNAR REGIME 
 
 The US is not only concerned about the significant number of illegal narcotics 
being shipped from Burma, but also level of repression enacted by the regime. The US 
states the purpose of the economic sanctions enacted on the Myanmar regime have 
specific intention of regime change in the country of Burma. “The aim is to isolate and 
squeeze the junta until it cedes power to  Suu Kyi, or moves towards true democracy.”278 
The exact phrasing from the US Department of State (DoS) is: 
The United States has imposed broad sanctions against Burma. Many of 
the sanctions in place are applied under several different legislative and 
policy vehicles. In 2003, the Congress adopted and the President signed 
into law the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA), which includes 
a ban on imports from Burma, a ban on the export of financial services to 
Burma, a freeze on the assets of certain Burmese financial institutions and 
extended visa restrictions on Burmese officials. Congress renewed the 
BFDA in July 2004 and again in July 2005. 
In addition, since May 1997, the U.S. Government has prohibited new 
investment by U.S. persons or entities. However, a number of U.S. 
companies exited the Burma market even prior to the imposition of 
sanctions due to a worsening business climate and mounting criticism 
from human rights groups, consumers, and some shareholders because of 
the Burmese Government's serious human rights abuses and lack of 
progress toward democracy. The United States has also imposed 
countermeasures on Burma due to its non-compliance with the 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on money 
laundering. 
For its particularly severe violations of religious freedom, the United 
States has designated Burma a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under 
the International Religious Freedom Act. 
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The United States downgraded its level of representation in Burma from 
Ambassador to Chargé d'Affaires after the government's crackdown on the 
democratic opposition in 1988.”279 
 
The effectiveness of this policy of economic sanctions against Burma, which have been 
in place since 1988 as an arms embargo and since 1997 as a total ban on all US economic 
dealings with the Myanmar Regime, are consistently in question.280    
 According to a recent Forbes sponsored study on sanctions; the US has led two-
thirds of the sanctions enacted against other countries since 1945.281 The article quotes a 
study by the Institute of International Economics (IIE) that states only 33% of all 
sanctions can be considered effective. Other studies point to a 5% success rate because 
other factors are the actual influencing the change in the sanctioned countries’ policies 
with a threat of invasion as the usual impetus for adjustment.282 Furthermore, it is not a 
change in “high politics” which adjust the success rate of sanctions, but instead, areas of 
“low politics.”283  
 There are five standards which are considered important in making economic 
sanctions effective, and ensuring the effect is delivered to the intended regime, and not 
transferred to the general population instead. They are: 
 
1. Well-defined, narrow goals 
2. Who pays? 
3. Multilateral Cooperation 
4. Allies and Adversaries 
5. Sanctioning Elites.284  
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In the question of the economic sanctions being levied upon Myanmar, the US-led 
sanctions fail in almost all of these categories. The goals for democratization are broad, 
and not defined by incentives to entice the regime to capitulate to the US’ policy 
requests.285 The “who pays” question has not been truly analyzed, and the complexity  
produced by the multiplicity of the conflict within Burma has resulted in the Burmese 
people and the numerous ethnic minorities all receiving the brunt of the damage form 
these sanctions, not the regime.  
For example, the Burmese garment industry, which exported 85 percent of the 
garments to the US previous to the sanctions, was devastated by the restrictions.286 The 
US administration has repeatedly pointed to this damage to the Burmese economy as a 
sign of the effectiveness of the policies. The garment industry though, has very little 
connection to the Military Junta. The garment industry in Burma is 88 percent privately 
owned, mainly through international investment into joint ventures, and employs 
primarily the Burmese population throughout its industry.287 The overall result was a 
miniscule $10 million dollar loss to the Tatmadaw, while overall, private industries in 
Burma lost sixty factories and unemployed over 60,000 workers in the first three months 
of the embargo.288  
Although the US has pursued multilateral cooperation from its allies, and has 
received the support of the United Nations on the sanctions, the efforts are not 
multilateral enough. EU countries, China, and ASEAN all oppose policies of isolation 
against Burma’s ruling Rangoon regime, ensuring their will be economic FDI to pursue 
away from the Western economies. This balances with the “allies and adversaries 
questions because the US has not fully assessed the importance of the ethnic minorities in 
the questions of economic sanctions.  
Finally, in the fifth factor which must be considered in the balance of economic 
sanctions: the issue of sanctioning elites, the US has failed in totality. Sanctioning a 
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country which does not care about its population is a useless practice. The damage to the 
economy can easily be re-distributed to the people. If the country’s goal is the eradication 
of a specific part of the population, sanctions are an ideal tool. 
The concern with the US’s counter-narcotic policies is that they are not being 
coordinated with the multilateral sanctions being implemented against the Myanmar 
Regime. The lack of coordination is what has enabled the Myanmar regime to manipulate 
these separate policies to complement their own policies of genocide.  
 
D. POLICY SUMMARY 
 
Up until this point, there has been a focus on history, actors, policies, and context. 
All of these analyses have focused on these issues and players singularly. Many of these 
actors have been overlooked, or treated as insignificant, in previous policy decision-
making by US regimes. All of these actors must be addressed in policy assumptions in 
















VI. MYANMAR’S MANIPULATION OF US AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES 
The previous chapters dealt with the environment, history, and context in which 
the Myanmar regime has implemented its policies of ethnic cleansing. This chapter will 
analyze those policies in the context of the Tatmadaw’s intention to preserve their power, 
and the unity of the country of Burma, at any cost.  
Due to the considerable support the ethnic minorities placed behind Aung San 
Suu Kyi in the 1990 elections, the Rangoon regime altered its traditional policies of direct 
confrontation with the ethnic minorities towards combined policies of slow eradication. 
Using historical revisions, cease-fire agreements, and manipulations of international 
policies towards the country, the Rangoon regime has been achieving these policies by 
combining direct removal alongside the slow eradication of the populations themselves.  
 
A. MYANMARIZATION  
 
When the SLORC suppressed the NLD after the May 1990 elections, they 
adopted a policy of ‘Myanmarization’. This policy focused on the unification of the 
country by re-claiming Burma’s connection to its ancient imperial past.  
The Burmese Ministry of Information, in 1989, published various papers on what 
the regime considers to be the real source of all of their modern problems: British 
Colonialism and the Western democratic powers.289 The state-run newspaper New Light 
Myanmar, and the state publications The Conspiracy of Treasonous Minions within the 
Myanmar Naing-ngan and Traitorous Cohorts Abroad laid the blame for poverty, ethnic 
conflict, and economic weakness at the feet of British Colonialism. These publications 
state that the world was full of:  
Foreign (chiefly Western) enemies yearning to re-enslave the Burmese 
nation. Chief among the treasonous minions is pro-democracy leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi, whose marriage to a British citizen and long residence 
abroad are cited as evidence of her use by evil-minded foreigners to 
sunder the nation.290 
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 Myanmarization is actually a tool of the regime, blended into the educational 
system of the country. Ethnic populations are unable to teach or study any syllabus not 
approved by the political educational institutions. In 1998, the Myanmar regime removed 
over 120 Mon schools, preventing 6000 students from attaining any education.291 The 
reason was, “The teaching of the Mon language and literature was not officially 
allowed.”292 Even Buddhist monks have been arrested for the “promotion of the use of 
the Mon language.”293 The important factor to understand is that prior to the democratic 
uprising of 1989, there was no policy of Myanmarization in the country of Burma. 
 This eradication of the ethnic minority languages and culture from the standard 
educational syllabi in Burma is actually just one of the more obvious implementations of 
the removal of the ethnic minorities by the Myanmar regime. Once this is seen in 
combination with the traditional “elimination” strategies used by the Rangoon junta in its 
history, the context of the Myanmarization policy becomes more apparent.  
 
B. FOUR CUTS STRATEGY 
 
The Four Cuts Strategy was originally implemented by the Tatmadaw in the mid 
1960s.294 The intention of the strategy was to cut off supplies of food, sources of funding, 
recruits, and intelligence. The Four Cuts Strategy was the Tatmadaw’s plan to eliminate 
the ethnic insurgencies military forces by removing their power base. Like removing the 
four legs of a chair, the military would eliminate the insurgent militaries’ connection to 
food, money, intelligence, and recruits.295 In this strategy, all villagers are considered 
resistance fighters, and no-one was innocent. Everyone was forced to fight, join, or flee 
from the Tatmadaw.296 
By the time the cease-fire was offered in 1989, the ethnicities were more than 
ready to agree to an alleviation of warfare, and to develop a new system of interaction. 
This system continues today with the Myanmar regime attempting to manipulate various 
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ethnicities against each other to preserve their own centralized position. It was to become 
an arrangement where the opium trade could flourish.  
With military force being constantly applied against the minorities in Burma, 
survival became the sole goal of the ethnic populations. Over time, the opium trade 
became the only avenue for survival, leaving the paramilitaries no other avenue in which 
to procure the necessary material in which to conduct their wars of autonomy. This 
makes the opium ban the ideal avenue for profit-building as well as an opportunity to 
undercut the Tatmadaw’s economic suppression of the ethnic minority populations.  
 
C. OPIUM BAN (TATMADAW) 
 
The “claimed commitment” to the opium ban by the military regime in Burma has 
been called questionable by the United States.297 The US, in 2004, stated that the 
Myanmar military regime has “failed demonstrably” to meet the international counter-
narcotics obligations.298 In fact, Burma is the only country which the US refused to 
certify as even attempting to fulfill counter-narcotic obligations.  The US refers to the 
regimes continual lack of effort in implementing any policies which would successfully 
eliminate the flow of illicit narcotics from the country. 
The shift from opium to ATS has enabled the Tatmadaw to maintain profits from 
their shadow economy connection to the ethnic drug lords. The cease-fire between the 
UWSA and the Tatmadaw is the most damaging obstacle faced by the other ethnic 
minorities in Burma. This is because, while other ethnic militaries have signed cease-
fires, the UWSA has become a proxy force for the Tatmadaw.   
According to Shan officials, “The UWSA is making a mockery of its anti-drug 
efforts. If the Burmese are serious about eliminating drug trafficking, they would fight 
the WA one day.”299 Even the Tatmadaw spokesman’ Colonel Hla Min, for the first time, 
publicly admitted: "We are fighting the war [on drugs] for them...This drug thing is not a 
big problem in this country."300  
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According to reports from Shan journalists in the region of the opium reduction, 
there is a subterfuge being perpetrated, with the Northern portion of the Shan region 
undergoing opium reduction, while the Southern Shan region, where the Wa have been 
relocating to, has been operating at higher levels.301   
Northern Shan State was chosen as the main area for the demonstration of 
Rangoon's seriousness. This appears to have been for the following main reasons: 
• The ability of its major allies there to survive without opium and its derivative, 
heroin, following the emergence of methamphetamines as an alternative export 
earning since the mid 90s;   
• The absence of armed resistance movements in the north after warlord Khun Sa 
surrendered in 1996 and after the Shan State Army "South" units' withdrawal to 
the south, which meant that active insurgency could not be used as an excuse for 
inaction against drug production;   
• The proximity of the area to the Chinese border: China had been putting pressure 
on Burma to stop the flow of drugs across the border  
• The fact that any decline of poppy production in the north could easily be offset 
by increased production in southern and eastern Shan State, most parts of which 
were off-limits to outsiders.302 
The Combined policies enacted by the Tatmadaw in the Shan region are as 
follows: 
Selective engagement – The Tatmadaw has targeted only the opium fields which 
are maintained by minorities which have not signed cease-fires with them.  
Harsh Reprisals – When the Tatmadaw, or their proxy forces (UWSA), strike at 
opium fields and refineries, it is usually with viciousness, extremely quick, and always 
extra-judicial in nature. When non-cease fire military forces attempt to cultivate and 
transport the opium, they are tracked and eliminated, regardless of sex, age, or ethnicity. 
Showcase Bonfires – When international pressure increase, the Tatmadaw likes to 
collect the opium, taken usually from starving farmers, and burn the collected narcotics 
for media events.  





Figure 11.   Opium Burning demonstrations by Tatmadaw Soldiers 
 
Vulnerable populations Affected – The farmers targeted for the opium ban patrols 
are usually in the outlying villages, and in territories where opium cannot be easily 
grown. With such reprisals levied against these remote farming villages, many are 
starving due to the continual removal of their sole “cash crop.”303 
The opium ban will affect the 250,000 families in the Shan State which will be 
forced to comply with the international standards set by the ban.304 
Rural communities risk being sacrificed in an effort to comply with 
international pressures about drug-free deadlines and US drug control 
certification conditions from neighboring countries.305 
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To achieve a sustainable decrease, alternative sources of income for basic 
subsistence for farmers have to be secured. Enforcement of the current tight deadlines 
does not allow alternatives to be in place in time, in spite of genuine efforts undertaken 
by UNODC and other international agencies. A humanitarian crisis will occur, 
jeopardizing the fragile social stability in the poppy growing areas.306 According to 
various experts in the region, along with the drug socio-economic culture which has 
resulted, state that the only viable and humane option lies in a simultaneous easing of 
drug control deadline pressures and increasing international humanitarian aid efforts.307 
Today it appears that few drug producers in Shan State share the earlier 
misgivings about producing methamphetamines. Speaking on the sidelines of a public 
poppy seed burning on 25 October 2002, a high-level civil servant in Lashio remarked:  
It's not surprising that Wa and Kokang (ceasefire groups) can afford to 
quit heroin, because they are free to engage in Yaba (methamphetamines). 
They don't have to worry about the weather. And they can churn it out 
anytime they want 
A ceasefire group leader residing in Lashio concurred:  
Opium might make a temporary disappearing act, but that's no 
consolation, because Yaba is making headway filling up the vacuum and 
more308 
  
The reason this manipulation is so easy to achieve is that there are only certain areas in 
which the flow of illegal narcotics can be tracked.309 
Cultivation, or the tracking by intelligence assets310 of the amount of hectares 
being utilized in order to produce drugs, is the main factor the US can proclaim to know 
with “reasonable” accuracy. The issue which is not traceable is the amount of finished 
product is produced from the hectares of farms used to produce the drug in question. 
Harvesting and processing estimates are then used to fill in the quantitative blanks.311 
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The important factor to take is emphasized in the INCSR itself: “The yield figures 
are theoretical”312. This enables the Tatmadaw and their allied paramilitary forces to 
manipulate what they present to the inspectors.  
Planned socio-political surveys of the Shan and Koknag regions where the 
alternative development programs have been implemented by the UNODC have been 
unable to be implemented.313 Lawlessness and significant security risks to the survey 
teams prevented any survey from occurring in 2005 despite the fact that widespread 
poverty has occurred in other areas where opium bans have been forced upon the 
population.314 The UNODC admits its assessment of the narcotic data is only the “best 
possible information gathered within these extenuating circumstances.”315 
Furthermore, the UNODC 2005 Myanmar Opium Survey does not have ground 
assessments or satellite imagery to analyze the Sangaing Division, Chin State, and Kayah 
State. The Survey discounts these regions as producers of opium poppies for local use, 
with no regional trafficking occurring.316 In the Kachin state, due to logistical constraints, 
only two townships were surveyed.317 In Special Region 4, where the 1997 declaration 
proclaimed a total removal of opium, no fields for cultivation were found. It is important 
to note, that even the report lists the survey as “rapid.” This gives much credibility to the 
accounts of the refugees who claim the Tatmadaw’s “War on Drugs” is a façade. 
The Wa population is not exempt from the actions of the UWSA either. The 
United Wa State Party (UWSP) proclaimed the opium ban and the UWSA are the known 
drug traffickers in the region. The general Wa population, who are the farmers who 
survive by the growth of opium, and facing the elimination of the sole crop which keeps 
the families in their territories fed.318  75 % of the farmers in this region use opium as a 
cash crop because of the inability of rice to be grown six months out of the year.319  
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The Wa leadership, in order to compensate for the need to move the opium 
farmers out of the region, are moving their population down to other regions that were 
captured in the wars with the MTA surrender in 1996.320 This forced relocation of the 
population is another one of the reasons for the conflict with the Shan, who previously 
resided and farmed those regions.  
The Wa Development program and the Yong Kha Development program are 
funneling funds to the region, and the Wa population through the Thailand cities of 
Chang Mai and Chang Rai, which border these Burmese Shan State territories.321 
The Wa leadership, although very dedicated to the opium poppy eradication in the 
required regions, have simply diversified into methamphetamine production. The 171st 
UWSA military region has seen the production of yaa baa jump dramatically.322  
Much of this is accomplished by the clandestine deals established between Wei 
Hseuh-Kang and the Rangoon regime.323 The Burmese military junta set one minority 
group against another while it conserved its own strength. The Junta saves manpower and 
weapons while creating drug revenues at the same time.324 The UWSA leadership is 
more than happy with this deal because they get to keep their drug profits, maintain their 
autonomy, and then overtakes the drug facilities and production of the minority warlords 
they defeat.325 
The Myanmar regime currently has counter-narcotic policies in place. According 
to figures produced by the regime in 2004, ATS seizures are on the rise, and eight million 
yaa baa tablets were confiscated, double the amount in 2003.326   
The UNODC, at its headquarters in Vienna, released this press statement 
concerning the success of the Opium Ban:  
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The vicious linkage between opium and poverty is being broken. Until 
recently the elimination of opium cultivation in the ‘Golden Triangle’ 
would have been considered impossible. It is now within reach. However, 
countries need assistance to sustain legal activities and alternative crops. 
With the support of the international community, an important and painful 
chapter of world drug history is coming to an end.327  
While the UNODC, and the supporting countries enacting policies to eliminate the illegal 
drug flow from Burma, believe that the elimination of the opium is achievable, the 
Myanmar regime will manipulate these policies for their own purposes. 
In “Show Business,” an independent investigation by a Shan news agency into the 
military regime’s “War on Drugs,” a new version of the policies enacted by the 
Tatmadaw becomes apparent. This investigation makes it very apparent that the junta has 
been staging “anti-drug” campaigns in regions opposed to their rule, and maintaining 
“staged” opium ban movements in areas the military and their cease-fire para-militaries 
control, like the UWSA.328  
In order to maintain control of Shan State without reaching a political settlement 
with the ethnic peoples, the regime is allowing numerous local ethnic militia and 
ceasefire organisations to produce drugs in exchange for cooperation with the state. At 
the same time, it condones involvement of its own personnel in the drug business as a 
means of subsidizing its army costs at the field level, as well as providing personal 
financial incentives.  
S.H.A.N. has documented the existence of at least 93 heroin and/or 
methamphetamine refineries in existence this year, run by the regime's military allies, 
with the complicity of local Burmese military units. Raids on refineries carried out during 
the regime's "war on drugs" have targeted only smaller players and served to consolidate 
control of the refineries into the hands of the major drug operators such as the United Wa 
State Army.329   
These accounts from the Shan refugees, as well as Shan dignitaries and leaders in 
exile, point to the extreme falseness of the Tatmadaw’s war on drugs, and its alternate 
intentions: the ethnic cleansing of the ethic minorities in the country. 
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D. ETHNIC CLEANSING 
 
The true intention of the Tatmadaw concerning the ethnic minorities at the fringe 
of Burma is to remove them from the population. Since the Tatmadaw took control of the 
Burmese government in 1962, their policies have focused on the solidarity of the country 
with themselves in total control. With the lack of success the regime has achieved 
through direct conflict, a return to a divide and conquers policy. The policies which the 
military regime pursues are oriented towards the result of removing the other minorities 
in Burma from existence. 
The ceasefires have enabled the Tatmadaw to use ethnic militaries against each 
other. The UWSA was used to defeat the MTA.330 Thousands of Shan soldiers are still 
fighting for autonomy against the Tatmadaw, but they are primarily doing it against the 
UWSA now.331 This frees the Tatmadaw from wasting equipment and trained soldiers 
against insurgent forces.  
The Tatmadaw has been operating forced relocations in conjunction with the 
UWSA, and have moved over 1400 villages by 1998.332 Amnesty International places the 
number of Shan displaced by the relocations at 300,000, but considers these to be very 
conservative estimates. In July 1997, eye-witnesses proclaimed to Amnesty International 
that 300 Shan who returned to one of their villages to get food were shot my Tatmadaw 
soldiers.333 
Thailand’s dealings with the refugees flowing over from the Burmese Shan State 
Region have been to allow refugee camps for certain ethnicities: Karen and Karenni. 
Thailand has been unwilling to establish refugee camps for the Shan, and have instead 
been using the Shan refugees for low-wage labor in industries in the country.334 
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Figure 12.   Refugee camps locations in Thailand. 
 
The opium ban has been the most useful addition to the traditional overt policies 
of eliminating the ethnic minorities in Burma. The removal of opium as a means of 
survival for the ethnic farmers in the mountainous regions, without giving those 
populations an alternate means of survival, will result in a humanitarian crisis of gigantic 
levels. The displacement of these populations, and starvation, only contribute to other 






1. Children Soldiers 
 
Children soldiers have been impressed into the Tatmadaw as early as the age of 
eleven335. In 2002, almost 70,000 of the 350,000 soldiers in the Tatmadaw were children. 
Since these children are removed from any contact with their family, it is a useful way to 
remove ethnic minority boys from growing up to the soldiers in the minority 
paramilitaries like the SSA or KNU, who also recruit child soldiers to fight.  
Since children are not usually effective soldiers, they are usually relegated to 
thieving duties for their officers or brutal forced labor. The children, due to their high 
death rate, are usually used to carry out human rights atrocities.336 On average, army 
battalions will keep an average of 50 to 250 boys at each of the 50 to 100 bases. At any 
time, there may be as many as 25,000 boys impressed into the military.337  
Resolution 1460, which the United Nations Security Council ratified to make the 
recruitment and use of children as soldiers in armed conflict a transnational crime.338 
Burma is also a signatory to the Convention on the rights of a child. Article 38 requires 
signatory governments to “take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not 
attained the age of fifteen do not take a direct part in hostilities.339  
 
2. Rape as a Tool of Ethnic Genocide 
 
Rape is a strategy of control used by the military Junta’s forces, and has become 
systemic under the military rule in Burma.340  
The “Catwalk Barracks” have been utilized by the military to remove the women 
from the ethnic minorities. In recent humanitarian reports from the Mon refugees who 
have escaped Burma, rape has been systemically used by Tatmadaw soldiers to: 
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• Rape and sexual slavery as punishment for being “rebel supporters” – 
Quite often the rape is done in connection with scalding water, knives, 
beating, kicking, and extreme brutality – due to the role of Mon, Shan, and 
Karen women as “sisters” to the whole community – this form of 
retribution is very harsh 
• Rape during conscription of women for “entertainment” -  a practice 
adopted from the Japanese military era in Burma, where “comfort women” 
where readily available to soldiers 
• Military Fashion and Beauty Show – fines of 15,000 kyat were levied 
against villages who would not contribute daughters to be chosen for 
“entertainment” duties – women are quite often sexually assaulted during 
the shows in front of their military audience 
• Conscription of women for sexual slavery in army bases – The “comfort 
women” are usually added to a regular “tour of service” where they are 
drugged and kept in a compliant state – a recent MON village head stated 
that 60% of the women in his village were selected at one time or another 
• Rape during Porter Service – Women were impressed into work service, 
carrying military equipment  
• Rape During Forced Labor – Since self-reliance in new business 
infrastructures has been passed on from the military forces in the field, a 
practice of operating sexual camps for the forced labor has been also put 
into action 
• Rape caused by increased military deployment and land confiscation – 
Sometimes, in the relocation of whole villages, these practices are put into 
place to increase the Burman blood in the country  
 
In truth, as stated by the report, women are not safe in any part of the country due 
to the Myanmar regime’s strategies.341 This is another of the reasons, when combined 
with the starvation,  
 
3. Refugees and Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) 
 
Refugees have been crossing the borders to escape the suppression of the military 
regime. The current number of refugees in Thailand now number approximately one 
million.342 International law considers a refugee to be  
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…[A]ny person who…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her] nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [or 
herself] of the protection of that country… 
Because the definition requires that a person be outside his or her country, 
it effectively excludes internally displaced persons from receiving 
international protection. Moreover, because it focuses on individualized 
persecution, it does not recognize situations of generalized violence (such 
as wars), natural disasters, and large-scale development projects as 
legitimate causes of flight.343 
 
Thailand only accepts refugees who flee from war, but these people are fleeing 
from “forced labor, executions, mass relocations, and systemic rape.”344 These refugees 
have been either repatriated or put to work in menial work (agriculture, fishing, etc.) at a 
mere fraction of the pay received by Thai workers performing the same work.345 
Currently, there are about 145,000 refugees along the Burma-Thai border.346 
These refugees are Karen, Kayin, and Kachin ethnicities. Shan refugees are not legally 
allowed to congregate in refugee camps in Thailand, and are immediately repatriated 
back to Burma into the hands of the Tatmadaw.347   
According to data collected on the refugees by the World Food Program in 2005, 
15% of the refugees face food insecurity while one-third of the children are chronically 
malnourished and 8% of the children being acutely malnourished.348 Reports from 
various refugee agencies have stated that the SPDC has actually restricted the access of 
these groups to the internally displaced persons within the country.349 
IDPs cannot be accurately counted, but are believed to be in the range of almost 
650,000 people made homeless in Eastern Burma alone.350 IDPs, under international law 
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thought, cannot be counted in the numbering of refugees, and are therefore in a much 
more precarious situation concerning receiving aid from international organizations. 
Furthermore, the IDPs are difficult top track in Burma because of the way so 
many of them are impressed into forced labor situations around the country.  
 
4. Health and Disease 
 
The failing health care system works in the favor of the Tatmadaw as well. 
HIV/AIDS have become rampant among the population in Burma. According to recent 
figures, the entire 2004 budget for the national HIV/AIDS program in Burma was 22,000 
US dollars, one of the lowest levels of spending in the world.351 Simply be managing an 
inadequate system of health care, the Regime is able to eliminate numerous members of 
the ethnic minority without direct confrontation. This also keeps the general Burman 
population weak and unable to support a democratic movement in the lowlands.  
This lack of interest in any part of the population is the key to understanding why 
the Myanmar regime will make no effort to stop the conflicts within their territorial 
borders. Instead of using direct warfare to eliminate the enemies of the state, they use the 
slow elimination of the population through indirect methods.  
 
E. CONFLICT PERPETUATION 
 
As stated by Jake Sherman in his analysis of the perpetuation of conflict in 
Burma, “if you do not care about your people, then sanctions are not an issue.”352 1/3 of 
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Part of the function of war may be that it offers a more promising 
environment for the pursuit of aims that are also prominent in 
peacetime…….[keeping] a war going may assist in the achievement of 
these aims, and prolonging the war may be a higher priority than winning 
it.354  
There are actually two conflicts in Burma: Military Junta versus the NLD / 
the military government and certain ethnic groups with which it is 
formally allied, and on the other hand, opposition armed ethnic minority 
group.355 
War represents something other than a breakdown or collapse………..rather a 
creation of an alternate system of profit.356 The Burmese themselves, who are also 
suffering from the cruelty of the Tatmadaw military regime’s rule, have not risen up to 
join the NLD and the ethnic minorities. “We are not thinking about  Suu Kyi or General 
Than Shwe………we’re thinking about food, clothes, and housing.”357 
Guy Horton produced a report in May 2005 called: “Dying Alive: A Legal 
Assessment of Human Rights in Burma.” This report focuses on the unique nature of the 
genocide in Burma. Unlike Rwanda, he states, there is not mass killing. Instead there is a 
slow, indirect form of destruction.”358 Horton notates the systemic rape and forced labor 
being used to remove unwanted ethnicities from the Myanmar regime’s path. To see the 
validity of Horton’s assessment of the slow methodic removal of inconvenient human life 
from the country of Burma by the regime requires an understanding of the dual economic 
nature of the Burmese economy. 
The importance of how the Myanmar regime is perpetuating this path of violence 
and ethnic cleansing requires a dual analysis of the economies in Burma. The first is a 
study of the overt economy, or the standard market economies tracked by international 
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1. Overt Myanmar Economy  
 
Since the overt economy is apparent through economic figures recorded around 
the globe by international agencies, it can be established through simple analysis of 
available data.  
The current Myanmar economy is in total disarray, and on the surface, seems to 
be teetering on the verge of total collapse. The current per capita income in Burma is now 
$225.00 US dollars per year equivalent. For comparison, the per capita income in 
Burma’s neighboring countries is much higher.359 In 1987, the World Bank listed Burma 
as a Least Developed Country (LDC), designating it as one of the worst-developed 
economies in the world. The Heritage Foundation recently called the Burmese economy, 
“the most distorted in the world save for North Korea’s.”360 Over seventy-five percent of 
the population in Burma lives below the poverty line.361  
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) currently ranks Burma 148 
out of 176 countries in gross educational enrollment rations and 157 out of 175 for Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). The infant mortality rate in Burma is fifty percent higher than 
other Eastern Asian countries.362   
The Burmese economy is heavily focused on agriculture, livestock, and fisheries, 
and forestry, accounting for 54 % of GDP. Manufacturing constitutes only 9 % while 
service account for 8 % of GDP. This leaves a significant amount of necessary black 
market and shadow economy economic support in order to keep the economy 
functioning. This is especially important when the number of new infrastructure is taken 
into account in the economic calculations.363  
Also, the banking industry in Burma has recently been designated one of the most 
corrupt and malleable in the world by World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) standards. The SPDC has ignored reports by the IMF, World Bank, and Asian 
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Developmental Bank to initiate reforms.364 Although no formal proof has been produced, 
it is believed the corrupt banking system has become a laundering crossroads for terrorist 
money. Some banks in Burma have been linked to drug cartels, and money laundering by 
the funds from the illicit drug industry.365 
 In 2003, resulting from the increase in sanctions from Western economies, over 
twenty banks in Burma collapsed. Two years later, the banking system was still 
considered moribund, and unlikely to rebound on its own. The monetary system in 
Burma has suffered as well, resulting in a severe devaluation of the Kyat, the official 
money of Burma.366  
 The absolute control of the country’s economy by the Tatmadaw is the main 
reason for the continually failing economy. The Tatmadaw’s absolute control is currently 
centered in two companies: the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) and the 
Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) who coordinate economic distribution through 
the country. Another organization, the Union Solidarity Development Association 
(USDA), which is controlled by the SPDC, is also involved heavily in the country’s 
economy.  
 The UMEH, in a 1995-1996 report, summed its purpose is “to support military 
personnel and their families” and “to try and become the main logistics and support 
organization for the military.”367 Only military members are shareholders in UMEH. The 
MEC’s purpose is to funnel the expenses of the military over to the private sector and 
away from the public sector. This economic mismanagement would be enough to cripple 
the rule of the Tatmadaw, except for their absolute control of another vital agency in the 
political economy.    
Another important facet of the Tatmadaw’s economic dictatorship is the Myanmar 
Investment Council (MIC), which controls all FDI in Burma.368 Any resource which 
comes into the country can be diverted by the junta in any fashion it wants.  Furthermore, 
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any resources the Tatmadaw can control within the country depart along the same lines, 
nearly 100% controlled by the SPDC and the ruling generals. 
 Although the economic system within Burma is on the ropes, there is still 
considerable foreign direct investment (FDI) into Burma. The Burmese country is also 
one of the most natural resource rich countries in the world. These investments into the 
infrastructure by other nation-states are considered to be the cornerstone of the “overt” 
economy in Burma today. Ironically, it is these investments which are the cornerstones of 
the “shadow economy” upon which the Myanmar regime in Burma survives.  
 
2. Shadow Economy 
 
In conflict economies, there is second economy which is linked, but is primarily 
separate from the “overt economy” which enables regimes like the Myanmar ruling 
military, to survive. As stated by William Reno, in his article: “Shadow States and the 
Political Economy of Civil Wars,” a shadow state is a relationship between corruption 
and politics, which has been created through a product of personal rule, and is usually 
constructed behind the façade of “de jure” sovereignty.369 In other words, the shadow 
state economy is a hidden market economy perpetuated in order to achieve the policies of 
the sovereign state.  
 
a. Structure of the Tatmadaw Shadow Economy 
 
In 1988, Burma possessed only $89 million in hard currencies, and yet 
possesses over $685 million in 2004.370 Even based on the questionable figures annually 
produced by the Tatmadaw-controlled economic agencies, these assets could not be 
produced at the same time the country was under such severe economic sanctions from 
the Western powers. 
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The era of rule under General Ne Win prepared the infrastructure for a 
dual economy to operate in Burma under his “Burmese way to Socialism.”371 The sale of 
raw materials372, foreign investment, and trade373 to maintain the power of the Tatmadaw 
regime, while ignoring the economic needs of its population, was a tried and true practice 
prior to 1988.374 This identical structure is now operating behind the scenes of Senior 
General Than Swe’s “Myanmar Roadmap to Democracy.” 
One of the vital cornerstones of the Myanmar regime’s perpetuation of 
rule in Burma despite a failing economy, economic isolation, and multiple perpetual civil 
wars is the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) received from abroad. Despite the 
US-led economic sanctions and political isolation, many countries are perfectly willing to 
partner with the Myanmar regime on large-scale economic endeavors.  
For example, France’s Standard Oil has invested considerably in Burma in 
return for the rights to natural gas and oil. Malaysia’s oil company Petronas has done the 
same by investing considerably in the infrastructure of extraction, refinement, and 
transportation of Burman oil.   
China is the largest contributor of funding to the Tatmadaw. China’s 
monetary support, although difficult to track, has numbered in the multi-billion dollar 
level. The majority of this investment has gone into the increasing military. As of 1995, 
the Chinese level of FDI had reached $1.2 Billion US, or sixty percent of the total 
investments and trade.375 This level is over three times higher than the 1992 China levels 
of seventeen percent, when Japan and Southeast Asia invested over sixty percent of the 
FDI to Burma.376 
Due to the military junta’s absolute control over the UMEH, the MIC, and 
the MEC, all FDI into the country can be manipulated by the Tatmadaw’s ruling 
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council377. Military expenditures have increased from twenty-nine percent to fifty percent 
of the government budget, not to mention the Shadow economic growth.  
China has established “economic trading zones” on the Burmese border, 
managed and maintained by local territorial governors. For example, the Jieago Border 
Economic Zone on the Sino-Burmese border enables over $400 million in trade, and is 
expected to reach $1.2 billion US by 2008.378 Gong Nengzheng, the mayor of the border 
trading town of Ruili, has undertaken the expansion of numerous bridges to increase the 
flow of trade between the two countries. Ruili’s “China-Burma Friendship Street” is an 
important  
The reason Burma is so lucrative to investing multi-national corporations 
and governments is the low cost of labor the Tatmadaw provides in these projects. This is 
primarily due to the slavery the Tatmadaw uses to complete the large-scale infrastructure 
projects investor nation-states desire to build in Burma. By forcing ethnic minorities into 
forced labor camps,  
Singapore currently maintains seventy-two separate projects in Burma, 
amounting to $1.6 billion US in FDI. India has also pursued infrastructure investment 
with the Myanmar regime, working on the development of a $1 billion pipeline to 
transfer oil across the country. Even Thailand, a long-time critic of the Myanmar 
regimes’ lack of control of the drug-producing ethnicities on their border, takes 
advantage of the low cost of labor in Burma. Imports from Myanmar-controlled Burma 
now number $1.5 billion US per year.  
Japan has justified their economic relationship with the Myanmar regime 
by arguing that isolation will only increase the violent nature of the government. This 
distinction is very important to understanding why so many countries continue to engage 
the Myanmar regime despite its atrocious human rights records.  
Although some countries can be characterized as simply being greedy, and 
turning a blind eye to the vicious practices of the Tatmadaw, some countries believe the 
continued economic relationships will enable the country to be brought to more civilized 
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practices. These countries, like Japan and South Korea, point to the failure of isolation 
policies pursued by the Western Economies. These isolationist policies, with their focus 
on human rights, only exacerbate the practices the Myanmar regime pursue, and increase 
their xenophobia.   
The Myanmar regime’s connection with China is vital to its survival as the 
ruling power in Burma. Being within China’s sphere of influence protects the regime in 
the face of Western pressure from the US and the UK coalition of the European Union 
who wants Aung Suu Sang Kyi freed and restored to her rightfully elected position as 
President of the Burmese Union. In a more historical sense, Burma is a crossroads 
between India and China, placing Burmese rulers in the precarious position of sitting 
between two considerable powers.  
Burmese regimes have long maintained their rule with the Chinese sphere 
of influence, and enjoyed the patronage of their neighboring superpower. This 
relationship solidified during the Cold War, when the Tatmadaw worked with Chinese 
support to fight the ethnic minority armies like the UWSA and the SSA, which had allied 
with the escaped Kuomintang Forces after the fall of China to the Communist forces.  
In analyzing intractable conflicts like the one in Burma, the internal 
dynamics need to be understood before any specific actions can be taken. In other words, 
if the intentions of the military regime, as well as the other players gaining benefits from 
the perpetuation of the conflict, are not understood, no coordinated policies can be 
achieved. 
The goal of the Myanmar regime is to maintain power using the traditional 
strategies of divide and eliminate among the ethnic minorities. The regime also desires to 
maintain the power by directly eliminating the NLD and its support. For China, the goal 
is to maintain its sphere of influence in Burma while maintaining a controlling access to 
the natural resources under the control of the Myanmar regime, specifically oil. 
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b. Benefits of the Shadow Economy 
 
The Tatmadaw maintains a hidden defense accounting which enables the 
regime to survive despite the failing economy. First of all, the pay-offs from the black 
market funding is unable to be tracked, which means any amount of corruption can 
contribute to the regime without being tracked. Like all forms of informal politics, it is 
extremely difficult to trace the flow of funds. 
Secondly, the Tatmadaw soldiers produce their own food. With no supply 
maintained by the superior chain of command in the military, all regional commanders 
are forced to exploit the agricultural production in their territories. Farmers are pillaged 
for their best foods in order to prevent being murdered, forced into slave labor, or having 
family members sent to the “catwalk barracks.” This damages the agricultural production; 
butt fulfills the Tatmadaw’s true goals of ethnic cleansing.  
The removal of food starves the general population in the region. This 
keeps the Burmese population weak and malleable, but also makes the encroachment of 
famine among the ethnic minorities much easier to progress. Since the goal is to weaken 
both of these potential insurgent forces, damage to the agricultural production is a cost-
effective way to ensure both populations are weakened. 
Third, the Tatmadaw is not charged for the electrical production received 
by the rest of the country. Its entire electric operating budget has been removed from the 
government’s accounting, enabling the continual flows of FDI to be focused on 
operational military budgets, as well as the purchase of new equipment for further 
warfare and violence.  
Fourth, the health budget of the Tatmadaw is separated from the general 
population, resulting in the military having protection from weakening health care 
system. An estimated thirty-fifty percent of Burma’s health budget is funneled directly to 
the military.379 Burma ranks 190th out of 191 countries in providing health care to its 
population. Only Sierra Leone ranks lower than Burma in this category.380 In a recent 




study of health care systems, it was found even bandages and simple pain killers were 
near impossible to acquire in the country, even in cities.381  
Fifth, a quota of the state’s rice production goes to the military before any 
other portion of the economy. This maintains the military’s food supplies above and 
beyond the general Burman population, and well above the ethnic minorities who focus 
the majority of their agricultural production on opium. This exacerbates the looting 
mentality of the regional commanders who have already exploited the local farmers for 
their personal and bureaucratic needs. After being exploited by the regional commander, 
the farmer will be forced to support the Tatmadaw on the national level as well.   
Sixth, the logistical requirements and procurements of the Tatmadaw 
regional commanders are not supported by the military regime itself. All procurement is 
managed through the regional commanders, forcing the same exploitation and pillage for 
the procurement of material to support the operational requirements of the local forces.  
Seventh, and final, is the benefit of forced labor to the Tatmadaw. The 
Tatmadaw is never forced to pay for the general labor in their forces. Occasional slave 
procurement missions will be undertaken to collect workers from the various ethnic 
minorities. The Mon, Shan, Karen, and Chin have all documented this continued practice 
to various international non-governmental organizations.  
These seven factors of shadow economy manipulation are very important 
because they all reflect the lack of importance of the “real” economy to the Tatmadaw’s 
day to day operating budget. With the short-term operating procurement tool of pillage 
available to the Tatmadaw forces, there is no reason to truly fear sanctions, even 
multilateral ones.  
Economic benefits do not just go to the Tatmdaw, but are also received by 
the leadership of the militant armed ethnic militaries operating with the Tatmadaw, like 
the UWSA. It is important to note, that these benefits do not spread down to the general  
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population of these ethnicities.382 The more and more gains that the Tatmadaw re-
distribute down to the ethnic leaderships, the less that is able to reach the Burmese or 
ethnic populations.  
The illicit drug trade in Burma is one of the strong supporters of the 
Shadow economy in the country. Drug profits are significant in supporting the regional 
military commanders. Since the Tatmadaw requires its regional armies to acquire their 
own food, clothing, and other sundry materials, these regional commands use the local 
populations, particularly the ethnic populations, to support their forces. This encourages 
the regional commanders to continue the regime’s policies of ethnic cleansing while 
maintaining their forces.  
 
F. SUMMARY  
 
The combination of the policies of eradication currently established by the 
Myanmar regime is supported by the counter-narcotic efforts, as well as the economic 
sanctions established, by the US in Burma. The regime’s goals of manipulating this 
policy is easy to see once an assessment of the dual economies being operated within the 
country are seen.  
In David Keen’ article: “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence,” a new 
analysis was devised, where conflict economies like the one in Burma, can be seen in a 
new light. Instead of the traditional view, where civil warfare only causes economic 
stagnation and peace is the only path to economic re-birth383, but instead “war represents 
something other than a breakdown or collapse……..rather a creation of an alternate 
system of profit.384  Once this alternate system of economic advantage can be seen, the 
understanding that the regime can accomplish its ethnic cleansing in spite of the 
numerous sanctions and policies placed against it.  
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The direction in which the Myanmar regime is progressing is far from conducive 
to the regional security of Southeast Asia. According to a recent article in Asia Times, the 
Myanmar regime fears an invasion from the US is imminent.385 This Asia Times “Special 
Correspondent,” who has remained nameless in the article, claims a recent forty page, 
Top Secret Document concerning the regime’s fears of a US-led invasion from Thailand 
will come soon. Although this document cannot be currently substantiated, it does match 
the recent actions of the Military regime, which were, up until recently, not reasonable.  
In early 2005, the Tatmadaw Military regime in Myanmar removed itself from the 
capital city of Rangoon. This “Xanadu,” which has come to be called “escape city” by the 
local Burmese, has been described as one of the largest construction sites ever seen.386 
This document also goes on to describe Thailand as Burma’s “nearest enemy,” pointing 
to the annual US-Thai joint Cobra Gold exercise as a point of contention.387  
The document also points to the new focus of the Tatmadaw to be a study of the 
United States’ military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and preparations for a war of 
attrition against the potential US military invasion.388 This new threat perception, re-
instigated with the separation of East Timor from Indonesia, and re-invigorated by the 
US’ recent pre-emptive invasions against into two countries in the past two years.  
The modernization policies undertaken by the Tatmadaw with Russia to 
complement the regime’s already expanding Chinese-supported forces have increased 
significantly in the past year.389 More importantly, these military hardware increases 
have been focused in the two portions of the Tatmadaw which is not traditionally 
counter-insurgency: the Navy and the Air Force.390 
According to a guerilla source in the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), 
the Myanmar regime has re-deployed considerable artillery forces along the Thailand 
border. This is significant because of the useless nature of hardened artillery positions 
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against “mobile, hit and run guerilla forces operating in a jungle-covered area.”391 The 
deployment of artillery positions of this manner are for defense against a potential 
invasion, much like the establishment of a bunker complex at Pyinmana.  
It is important to note, that the combination of policies enacted since 1990 
concerning Burma, have only resulted in increased paranoia, centralization of power 
around the Tatmadaw ruling council, and further human rights atrocities being 
undertaken against the total population of the country. A re-evaluation of the policies 












                                                 




























In 1967, a KMT General stated:  
Necessity knows no law. That is why we deal with opium. We have to 
continue to fight the evil of Communism, and to fight you must have an 
army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have 
money. In the mountains, the only money is opium.392  
 
Although the KMT has been removed from the region for a long time, this 
General’s view of the opium trade is as accurate today as it was in 1967. It has simply 
expanded beyond opium to yaa baa methamphetamines. Also, this desperate position of 
relying on the illicit narcotics trade to survive and fight has stayed with the ethnic 
minority armies who are still seeking autonomy.   
 As long as the issue of sovereign rule for the myriad of ethnic minorities exists, 
the US counter-narcotic policies in the region will find no success. Furthermore, as long 
as the US pursues separate single-focused policies of counter-narcotics and 
democratization in Burma, those policies will contribute to the Myanmar regime’s hold 
on power in the country. Even worse, it will enable the Myanmar regime to continue its 
policies of ethnic cleansing against the minorities in Burma.  
 Since the US and its allies are unable to step back from its stances on counter-
narcotics and democratization, a more unified focus is required, resulting in a progressive 
engagement of the problems resulting from the “Burmese Jigsaw.”393 The complexity of 
the Burmese puzzle requires policies which can encompass the complexity of the issues.   
 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
The policy recommendations will be presented for counter-narcotics and for 
economic sanctions separately, with a summary analysis of the unifying factors which 
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can be accomplished by adjusting these policies, a new progressive application of 
diplomatic pressure can be applied to change the Myanmar regime’s actions in Burma. 
 
1. Counter-narcotic Policies 
 
The US has a history of bilateral successes in counter-narcotics operations and 
policy implementations.394 For that reason, the counter-narcotic policies in Burma have 
been tailored along those lines. Very minimal action has been taken to enhance 
multilateral counter-narcotics efforts outside of the education leg of the triumvirate 
policies. Although this can be blamed on the lack of infrastructure in modern Laotian, 
Chinese, and Thai law enforcement agencies, the US can support more than the 
educational facet of their policies.  
With the current focus in “virtual” border security being developed in the United 
States along the Mexico border, these technologies, and the advisory support which goes 
with it, can be extended to these countries’ counter-narcotic agencies.  
With the MOU-6 in place, there is a UN treaty framework to increase multilateral 
patrols on the Mekong River. US counter-narcotic efforts in Latin America have been 
effective with the development of US advisory groups for the development of riverine 
forces to patrol in a law enforcement mission capacity.  
Overall, the failure of the counter-narcotic policies in Burma is due to the political 
situation in the country, not the implementation of the policies themselves. As seen by the 
previous quote by the KMT General, without a removal of the conflict in Burma, there 
will be no removal of the opium trade to support the conflict.  
It is important to note that the removal of the conflict would reduce the SPDC and 
the ethnic paramilitaries’ connection to the drug trade. To accomplish this though, a more 





                                                 
394Downloaded from www.unodc.org on September 13, 2005. Also in the INCSR 2006.  
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2. Economic Sanctions 
 
The US should not remove its economic sanctions from the Myanmar regime, but 
it should remove its policies of isolation. The policies of isolation have simply moved the 
country of Burma directly into China’s sphere of influence. The adjustment of sanctions 
to a “carrot and stick” progressive engagement would influence the Myanmar regime to 
move towards more and more compromises with the NLD and ethnic paramilitaries in the 
country. 
If there is progressive framework which gives concessions for each step the 
Tatmadaw regime makes, then there is a possibility of slow integration back into the 
community of nation-states. A step by step framework would resemble concessions like 
these: 
A. Release of Aung San Suu Kyi in return for diplomatic recognition  
B. Restoration of the NLD’s seat in the constitutional congress in return for 
US economic grant packages  
C. Cessation and guarantee of the autonomy agreements of the ethnic 
minorities in Burma (with their acceptance of Union of Burma 
sovereignty) in return for economic normalization with US and Western 
European nations  
 
It is important to note that this is a simplified version of the multitude of steps which 
would need to be taken, but it expresses the engagement policies which would 
accomplish the ability to increase diplomatic relations, and possibly stem human rights 
atrocities being perpetrated in the country. 
 
3. Combined Policies towards Burma 
 
Any policies being considered towards Burma cannot be devised without 
consideration towards its position in the greater international arena. Therefore, policy 






China maintains more relations with the Myanmar regime than any other 
country. They are in the best position to engage the Myanmar regime without forcing the 
regime deeper into xenophobia. Increased pressure from a unified US-China stance 
would influence the Myanmar regime more effectively than the singular US approach. 
Currently, the time is more advantageous for a unified approach from these two great 
powers. 
China’s relationship has been strained as of late with Myanmar. Beijing, 
despite rolling out the red carpet for the visit of Prime Minister General Soe Win in the 
beginning of 2006, has been frustrated with corruption in Burma concerning Beijing 
sponsored infrastructure projects.395 Corruption has slowed many projects in Burma, to 
include: construction of a major container yard at Bhamo, a deep sea port at Kyakphu, 
and highway connecting the port to the container yard.396 Still, financial support, as well 
as public support, is till forthcoming from Beijing concerning the Myanmar regime, and 
their mutual relationship.  
China’s relationship with Burma’s regime is no different from its 
relationships with other countries in its sphere of influence.  
China needs to realize that until it stops protecting tyrants in its 
neighborhood and around the world (North Korea, Burma, Pakistan, 
Sudan, Iran), China cannot win respect as a responsible and constructive 
global great power.397 
China must develop its reputation as a contributing member of the 
international community if it hopes to continue its rise to a position of more prominence 
among nation-states outside of its sphere of influence. China must take a position which 
enables a stronger leadership position in global arena, and a developed stance towards 
human rights concerning  
   
                                                 






ASEAN is in an advantageous position to facilitate change in Burma. 
Burma has reacted to internal pressure from its fellow ASEAN members previously.398 
As stated by the ICG Myanmar report on economic sanctions in 2004: ASEAN has a 
particular role and responsibility to encourage the necessary change.399 Although 
ASEAN nation-states have operated on a policy of elective engagement to prevent this 
very occurrence, the increase in relations between China and the Myanmar regime shows 
the failure of this policy. The important lesson from ASEAN and Burma is the success of 
the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC) in influencing the Myanmar 
regime with direct engagement.   
The APMIC was formed in November 2004 by ASEAN legislators in 
Malaysia in order to leverage pressure on the Rangoon regime to comply with the 
requirements of its ASEAN membership.400 The initial campaign by AIPMC was the 
campaign to have the Myanmar regime give up its turn as the Chairman of ASEAN.401 
AIPMC has come out in public support of the UN Security Council 
petitions by the Honorable Vaclev Havel and Nobel Prize Laureate Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu’s joint declaration for the UNSG to intervene in Burma.402 AIPMC has even been 
so bold as to leverage pressure on China, requesting the country to use its influence with 
the Rangoon regime to facilitate further democratic reform.  
With the UNSC once again petitioned by ASEAN nation-states and the 
Western world, the pressure on Burma to change has increased. Still, with China and 
France holding veto positions in the UNSC, there is very little hope for a consensus vote 
on the country. While the UNSC can be used as a forum for political debate, it has been 
                                                 
398 The option to not take its appointed turn as the Chairman of ASEAN in 2006 – 2007 was decided 
by the Myanmar regime under considerable pressure from the other ASEAN member nation-states.  
399 ICG Report: “Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement, or another way forward?” 
400 Downloaded from www.aipmc.org on April 16, 2006.  
401 Ibid. 
402 AIPMC SEP 23 Press Statement, p. 1. 
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hindered by the veto power of the council members. Regional efforts will enact change, 
while the UN will be used as a support mechanism for those changes.  
 
4. Policies after the Sanctions are Revised 
 
These US policies were not implemented with wrong intentions. The cultivation 
and trafficking of illegal narcotics, especially those as dangerous as the ones grown in 
Northeastern Burma, should be stopped. Also, the Myanmar regime should have 
diplomatic and economic pressure placed on it for its numerous atrocities and refusal to 
honor the NLD’s victories in the 1990 elections. The US must simply re-assess its 
position in the world, and its ability to influence other countries diplomatically and 
economically.  
Also, the timing for the original implementation of these policies occurred in a 
different international political arena. With the close of the Cold War, numerous 
countries enacted more and more democratic reforms in their political institutions. Also, 
the United States’ popularity as the leader of the free world and leader of human rights 
movements resulted in considerable diplomatic strength. Today, in the era of the GWOT, 
the US’ waning popularity following the 2003 invasion into Iraq, and the rising regional 
powers of China and India, the US does not have the ability to leverage the need unified 
front on Burma it could in the 1990s.  
The US must maintain its stance of illicit narcotics, human rights, and 
democratization. Without a doubt, they are cornerstones of US foreign policy. This does 
not mean that an assessment of how those policies are implemented cannot be re-
evaluated. With seventeen years of no discernable success, an assessment of the global 
arena where these policies are being implemented was necessary. 
Current US economic and diplomatic pressures on the Myanmar regime allow for 
two outcomes: the fall of the regime by economic starvation or the fall of the regime by 




seek nothing more than survival, as stated in their national strategy. The result of this, in 
the past seventeen years, is a further and further retreat into isolation, and in increase in 
the brutality of their policies of control.  
Once the economic sanctions are refined, and a more realistic policy of 
engagement is established with the Myanmar regime, a return to the US and UN counter-
narcotic efforts, in their current incarnation, can be implemented. The combined 
triumvirate of policies enacted by the UNODC and the US drug agencies are not bad 
policies. They are simply being implemented in a global context which undermines their 
effectiveness. 
The ethnic minorities in Burma need a developmental program to remove opium 
and yaa baa as their sole source of survival. While they are being ethnically cleansed, and 
are forced to fight for their very existence, there will be no hope for these policies to be 
effective.  
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